Terror and tourism : the economic consequences of media coverage by Besley, Timothy et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) 
The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published 
elsewhere. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/131584                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic 
citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to 
above, will contain details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Warwick Economics Research Papers 
 
 
 
ISSN 2059-4283 (online) 
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)  
 
Terror and Tourism:  
The Economic  Consequences of Media Coverage 
 
Timothy Besley, Thiemo Fetzer and Hannes Mueller  
(This paper also appears as CAGE Discussion paper 449) 
 
December 2019               No: 1235 
 
Terror and Tourism:
The Economic Consequences of Media Coverage
Timothy Besley Thiemo Fetzer Hannes Mueller∗
December 17, 2019
Abstract
This paper studies the economic effects of news-coverage of violent events.
To do so, we combine monthly aggregated and anonymized credit card data on
tourism spending from 114 origin countries and 5 tourist destinations (Turkey,
Egypt, Tunisia, Israel and Morocco) with a large corpus of more than 446 thousand
newspaper articles covering news on the 5 destination countries from a subset of
57 tourist origin countries. We document that violent events in a destination are
followed by sharp spikes in negative reporting at origin and contractions in tourist
activity. Media coverage of violence has a large independent effect on tourist
spending beyond what can be accounted for by controlling for the incidence of
violence. We develop a model in which tourist beliefs, actual violence and media
reporting are modelled together. This model allows us to quantify the effect of
violent events and reporting.
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1 Introduction
Media reporting plays a critical role in spreading information about events of pub-
lic interest. Violent events are particularly prone to attract intense media coverage.
Even single isolated events can therefore erode perceptions of security if they attract
intense coverage. This is particularly problematic if reporting deters visitors from
abroad, who could contribute to the economy by trading in goods, through spending
as tourists or by bringing in foreign capital and expertise. Given the benefits of open-
ness and economic integration in general (see Frankel and Romer, 2008; Melitz and
Trefler, 2012) and tourism in particular (see Faber and Gaubert, 2016), media reports
could then have detrimental consequences for economic development.
Little is known about the extent to which news coverage shapes the economic
impact of violent events. Nor do we know whether the economic repercussions of
violent events are short-lived or persistent. Gaining insights into these questions re-
quires appropriate data to measure both, the economic responses to insecurity, and
the nature and timing of news coverage. To quantify the effect of news coverage we
also need to integrate this data into models of news reporting and beliefs. This paper
makes a unique contribution using two novel data sources. First, we use aggregated
and anonymized spending data from Mastercard (hereafter ”aggregate spending”)
for one hundred and fourteen origin countries in five destinations (Egypt, Israel, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia and Turkey) as a measure of tourist activity.1 This data offers the
advantages of being available monthly and being dyadic, i.e. it reflects aggregated
spending from an origin country (where the cardholder accounts are registered) and
a destination country. Since tourism is an export industry, this is similar to exercises
that measure international trade flows at a dyadic level.
Figure 1 shows the correlation of aggregate spending with a specific violent inci-
dent in which thirty-nine tourists were killed on June 26th 2015 in Sousse, Tunisia. The
majority of the victims were UK citizens. The lines in the figure contrast the response
of tourism spending on two specific dyads based on origin country: British (the dotted
1Mastercard made the anonymized and aggregated data available subject to robust privacy and data
protection controls – and in line with their principles guiding the ethical collection, management and
use of data.
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line) and German (the dashed line), while overall average spending patterns across
all dyads is indicated by the solid line.
(Figure 1)
The figure highlights that aggregate tourism spending falls immediately in the
months following the attack. However, tourism spending from Britain dropped much
more compared to tourism spending from Germany. One candidate explanation,
which we explore here, is that this heterogeneity is down to the differential intensity
of news reporting on the event in the two tourist origin countries.
To capture the news environment, the second data set we built is a corpus of
nearly half-million news articles. This corpus covers articles from fifty-seven origin
countries covering our five destinations from 2009 to 2016. We auto-translate all arti-
cles and identify a subset of articles that report on fatal violence or violence against
tourists. Given the size of the corpus we use methods from computational linguistics
and supervised machine learning to develop an automated classifier of reports on
violence. This classifier then gives us a measure of the relative intensity of reporting on
violence at the dyad which is matched with the data on spending flows.
We use the news data to show that differential media coverage in origin coun-
tries can explain the heterogenous effect around violent events suggested in Figure 1.
We document a robust relationship between the intensity of reporting on violence and
subsequent drops in tourism activity. These results are found even after fully account-
ing for destination- and origin-specific variation. Moreover, there are no discernible
pre-trends in either news reporting or spending. Lastly, we also use an instrumen-
tal variable approach leveraging the distribution of nationalities of casualties around
known events, yielding very similar results. The effects that we find are sizeable;
we estimate that if media-reporting on a specific dyad switches from reporting on
topics unrelated to violence to covering only stories about tourists being targeted,
then tourism spending drops by about 56 percent a month later. The effect of news
reporting that we find comes from the share of news coverage dedicated to violence.
Furthermore, this effect is persistent, lasting for about nine months following the cov-
erage.
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Motivated by these core findings, we fit a statistical model of violence, reporting
and spending to the data. Its construction is inspired by the work of Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) who propose that potential tourists may think in terms categories
such as “safe” and “dangerous”. We assume that tourists try to avoid destinations
perceived to be “dangerous” and model this underlying risk as a latent state variable
which drives both reporting and violence. In this way we are able to model changes
in the objective risk, how this drives reporting and how both together affect tourist
spending.
In order to capture the role of news in the model we suppose that some tourists are
”naı¨ve” in the sense that they only observe what is covered in the news. We contrast
this type of tourist with a ”sophisticated” type of tourist who observes the objective
measures of violence and builds her perception of the risk of danger based on this
data.2 Using a grid-search we estimate the mixture of tourist-types that best captures
the observed patterns in aggregate spending in response to violence. Since we model
both reporting and risk perceptions together, we can also show explicitly how high
levels of reporting of non-violent events can effectively “drown out” reporting about
violent events. As a result, naı¨ve tourists in our model might not react at all to news
on violence if the overwhelming majority of news is on other issues.
Finally, our model-based approach also gives insights into the pattern of persis-
tence of media-coverage on spending. We hypothesize that booking vacations de-
pends on beliefs held at the booking or cancellation date. We then back out from
the data an estimate of what share of tourists appear to have booked or cancelled
their travel at each date. This exercise suggests that the pattern of persistence in the
spending response is “explained” by more than 40 percent of tourists booking their
vacations more than three months in advance implying that there is some persistence
in spending to violence and news reporting.
This paper contributes to a large and growing literature which studies the im-
pact of the media on economic and political outcomes (see Stro¨mberg, 2015 and Prat
and Stro¨mberg (2011), for reviews).3 Our contribution is to look at news events and
2Both labels are obviously a modeling device as we only observe aggregates disaggregated by month
and origin/destination dyad.
3The impact of the media on politics and economics has been the subject of many papers: Stromberg
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coverage across multiple countries. This complements a body of work that has fo-
cused in detail on US news coverage and its consequences. For example, Eisensee
and Stro¨mberg (2007), shows that news on droughts affect US disaster relief. Simi-
larly, Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018), suggests that offensives in the Israel Palestine
conflict are strategically aligned to minimize news coverage in the US, while Jetter
(2017) suggests that Al Qaida activity may be endogenous to preceding US television
news coverage.4 We contribute to this literature by providing dyadic news data which
we embed in a model of violence, reporting and beliefs.
The paper relates to a growing literature which uses text as data. Drawing on na-
tional newspapers and a simple dictionary, Baker et al. (2016) construct an economic
policy uncertainty index for a host of countries. Hassan et al. (2019) make use of com-
putational linguistics methods to develop a dictionary of terms for the measurement
of political risk documenting that increased political risk induces more lobbying activ-
ity. Mueller and Rauh (2017), following a similar approach to Hansen et al. (2018), use
unsupervised learning, so-called topic models, to assess to what extent Western (US
and UK-based) media coverage can predict violence risk. In this paper, we instead
deploy supervised machine learning methods to produce a measure of violence in the
news. This approach allows us to test explicitly, through cross-validation, how good
our method is in identifying reporting on violence in the news.5 The good perfor-
mance of our method suggests that this way of producing data from text, i.e. letting
the machine figure out which parts of the text are most relevant, might also be useful
in other applications.
We show that the economic impact of violent events on tourism activity is signif-
icantly driven by the underlying news reporting. In this regard our work relates to
an emerging literature on how news “shocks” affect economic behavior (see Ramey,
2011). Arezki et al. (2017) documents that news reports on resource discoveries have
(2004) on redistributive spending, Besley and Burgess (2002) on government accountability, Gentzkow
(2006); Bursztyn et al. (2017) on voter turnout, Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010) on citizen knowledge,
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) on voting patterns, Durante et al. (2019) on the proclivity towards pop-
ulist rhetoric.
4We observe that news coverage sharply responds to violent events, but not in anticipation.
5There is still relatively little work in economics leveraging supervised machine learning. We use
cross-validation to show that an ensemble of naive bayes and random forests provides relatively large
gains over simpler methods commonly used (see Manela and Moreira, 2017; Becker and Pascali, 2019).
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near immediate impacts on the current account and Eggers and Fouirnaies (2014) doc-
ument that news about the technical declaration of a recession has a contractionary
effect on the economy. This raises questions about how people collect and process
news and whether they might overreact to particular forms of coverage (see Azeredo
da Silveira and Woodford, 2019, Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018 and Bordalo et al.,
2018). Given that we explain a significant amount of heterogeneity in the response
to the same facts driven by news reporting, our findings also support the idea of
”overreaction” and/or selectivity in access to information. This relates to discussions
beyond economics. For example, Singer and Endreny (1993) suggests that hazards are
distorted by mass media and that ”emotion, not reason, is likely to govern our response
to those hazards for which we depend on the media for information.” (p.41) This is particu-
larly relevant if social media amplify echo chambers (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005;
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011), which can spread fake news and/or entrench extreme
views (Barrera et al., 2017; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017).
We also contribute to an emerging literature on the consequences of violence and
disorder on trade and economic integration. For example, Besley et al. (2015) measure
the cost of piracy in the Gulf of Aden on shipping costs and hence on trade. They
emphasize that violence can increase trade costs which the trade literature has shown
can have a significant impact on trade flows (see, Feyrer, 2019, Donaldson, 2018).
However, the mechanism we focus on here is closely related to Burchardi et al. (2019)
who show that better information on a country, due to ancestry, is an important driver
of foreign investment decisions. Tourism is an increasingly important sector that
supports up to 313 million jobs across the globe.6 We show that tourists with more
information react less to idiosyncratic media reporting because they have a broader
informational base and this can be an important factor in the overall effect of violence
on economic ties. This is particularly relevant in the MENA region which is one of
the least economically integrated regions (Rouis and Tabor, 2012) and where growing
economic ties to Europe are important.
6See WTTC (2018). A small literature within economics studies tourism using robust methods. For
example, Faber and Gaubert (2016) show that, in Mexico, tourism produced significant local economic
gains. Neumayer (2004) uses cross country panel data to show that violence is negatively associated
with tourism arrivals.
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There is now a large literature on the economic costs of violence to which this pa-
per contributes. For example, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) documents the sizable
negative economic consequences of terrorism in Spain and Besley and Mueller (2012)
looks at the impact of house prices using regional variations in violence in North-
ern Ireland. More recently this literature has shifted towards identifying the mecha-
nisms through which lack of security affects the economy. For example, Amodio and
Di Maio (2018) shows how firms bear the direct and indirect costs of violence and po-
litical instability. Jha and Shayo (2019) explore how individuals re-evaluate the costs
of conflict upon being exposed to financial assets whose prices may be vulnerable to
the economic risks of conflict. Brodeur (2018) shows that successful terror attacks in
the US reduce the number of jobs and total earnings in the affected counties. This
paper adds to this literature by highlighting a new mechanism: news coverage itself
can amplify the negative economic consequences of terrorism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the
data used in some detail. Here, we also discuss the supervised learning method
through which we make the text data usable for the subsequent analysis. In section 3,
we present reduced form results of the average effect of violence on tourism activity
before incorporating the news data. In section 4, we propose a statistical model and
fit this on both the news and the tourism activity data. Concluding comments are in
section 5.
2 Data and Feature Extraction
This paper uses three main data sources: (i) aggregated spending data by origin
and destination country, (ii) measures of terrorism and conflict and (iii) a large corpus
of dyad-specific news content. We describe each of these followed by a discussion
of the supervised machine learning method that is used to identify news coverage of
fatal violence and attacks on tourists.
2.1 Aggregated Spending Data
Mastercard provided us access to an anonymized and aggregated monthly data
set which included the number of transactions and number of active cards based on
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spending in five different countries (Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) by
the country of origin of the card. Mastercard made the anonymized and aggregated
data available subject to robust privacy and data protection controls. Where Master-
card’s controls may have resulted in, for example, a blank monthly-dyad observation,
we excluded all of those dyads where we have fewer than 60 months (5 years) of data
and origin countries with fewer than 3 out of 5 destination dyads.7 The origin coun-
tries in our sample span all continents but trend towards higher income countries
and those that are closer to the destination countries.8 Figure 2 maps all of the origin
(card-issuing) countries that we have in the sample.
(Figure 2)
There are dramatic differences between origin countries with low volume of cards
active per month in tourism spending, such as countries like Haiti and Namibia com-
pared to higher volume tourism spending from countries such as Germany and the
United States.
The aggregated card data can be a proxy for annual patterns in travel flows: for
a small set of countries annual data on travel flows is provided to the United Na-
tions World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO). Appendix Figure A1 highlights that
the annually-aggregated card data correlates with the travel flows data very closely.
Appendix Table A1 presents further regression evidence highlighting the close fit.
2.2 Data on Violent Events
We use five different data sources, three of which are hand-coded event data while
the other two are constructed using automation.
Manually-coded data sources As our core data on terrorism we use the Global Ter-
rorism Database (GTD) which is an open-source database that codes information on
terrorist events around the world between 1970 and 2017 based on reports from a
variety of media sources. These reflect world-wide rather than country-specific news
coverage and the information is verified by the GTD research team to establish the
7Results are robust to changes in this rule.
8We also include cards originating in the destination countries themselves. These data can be
dropped leaving results unaffected.
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credibility of the information source. The data focus on the type of violent events
that are likely to influence the desirability of a destination for tourists.
As supplementary human-coded sources of data, we also leverage the Georefer-
enced Event Dataset (GED) provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).9
Automated Data We use the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) database
created for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Office of
Naval Research (ONR). This event-level data comprises coded interactions between
socio-political actors (i.e., cooperative or hostile actions between individuals, groups,
sectors and nation states). Similar to the approach used in Fetzer (2019), events are
identified in a fully automated way and are extracted from news articles, essentially
consisting of triplets based on a subject (a source actor), an event type (indicated by
a verb) and an object (a target actor). Geographical-temporal metadata are also ex-
tracted and associated with the relevant events. In this paper, we focus on events that
have been coded as assaults, which include events like hijacking, suicide bombings
and assassinations and along with data on fights or escalations, which includes the
use of military force, fights with artillery and tanks and aerial bombing.
The second automated dataset is the GDELT platform which monitors the world’s
news media from nearly every corner of every country in print, broadcast, and web
formats, in over 100 languages, every moment of the day stretching back to January
1, 1979 to produce data on events.10 GDELT is more inclusive, yet it may also include
also more false positives and it also has less stable source material over time and codes
the news sources only from 2014 onwards.
Both of these data sources have in common that they aim to identify the “true”
set objective violent events. Neither of them provides a measure of the likely salience
of an event nor the intensity of news coverage about a violent event across different
countries.11 We next describe how we construct a dyadic dataset of news coverage for
57 of our issuing countries, i.e. for 285 dyads.
9Results are also similar when studying the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
data. As these are currently only available for the three countries on the African continent we do not
include them in the analysis.
10This data has been used by Manacorda and Tesei (2016).
11To the best of our knowledge, such a data set does not exist.
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2.3 Data on News
The news data variable that we construct is intended to proxy the news cover-
age that potential tourists have access to in a given country when they decide on
their holiday destination. A key concern here is measurement error both because the
media landscapes differ across countries and because it is not clear a priori which
specific news items are viewed. To obtain dyad-specific variation in news coverage,
we develop a large scale corpus for 57 tourist-origin countries. For each tourist-origin
country we identify a leading news source for which a digital archive of all articles
is available over our sample period. For each of these sources, we then download
all articles that relate to each of our five destination countries covering the period
from 2009 to 2016. The tourist origin countries for which we have both card data
as well as media coverage data are indicated in dark grey in Figure 2. The coun-
tries for which we have news data represent, by far, the biggest chunk of the world
economy, comprising all G20 nations along with a host of other significant emerging-
market economies. Hence, although we cannot say that this is globally representative,
the consequences of changes in tourist spending in these countries are likely to be
economically important for the destination countries that we study.
The resulting data set contains more than 450,000 individual articles, out of which
307,000 articles were translated into English using Google Translate. The translation to
English allows us to produce a single consistent classifier to code individual articles.12
2.4 Supervised Machine Learning Approach
We use supervised machine-learning to classify individual articles according to
whether they report violent incidents or incidents directly involving tourists. We pro-
ceed in four steps. First, we use human coding to classify a subset of the data which
we use as a training dataset to generate our news indicators. Second, we use super-
vised machine learning to train a set of classifiers to predict the human classifications
in the training set and classify unseen articles. In this step, the availability of training
data allows us to check performance of the classifier using cross-validation. Third,
12Appendix Table B1 presents the main source by country, the origin language and the number of
articles included in our database. For a few countries only news wire agency reports were available;
our results are robust to dropping these countries from the analysis.
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we check a subset of the classified articles by hand to generate out-of-sample perfor-
mance measures and reduce measurement error further. Finally, we aggregate the
resulting scores to produce a count of news about violence for each dyad/month or
dyad/day. We then express this as a share of all news in the same dyad/month.
Training data set To build the training set, human coders classified a sample of
around 30,000 articles (approximately 7% of the data). The coding guidelines con-
sisted of two binary classification questions that were used to construct two separate
measures of violence. Specifically, human coders were asked to flag up individual
articles with a binary indicator if:
1o the article indicates that there were fatalities as a result of violence
2o the article indicates that tourists were harmed due to a violent event
The underlying classes are quite unbalanced relative to the population of articles.
This can make it difficult for statistical learning methods leveraged for classification
purposes to separate the data adequately. To navigate this issue, in drawing our train-
ing sample, we follow Japkowicz and Stephen (2002) and oversample articles around
days for which the Global Terrorism Database indicated that an event occurred. In
addition, when training our classifier we sample such that we get a 1:1 set.
Classification approach In the second step, we train a set of classifiers in Python us-
ing the scikit-learn packages developed by Pedregosa et al. (2011). Individual articles
are represented using the common bag of words language model so that each docu-
ment can be expressed as a vector of counts. We use standard stemming procedures
and remove stop words. We then produce all trigram word features and exclude
terms that appear in less than 100 documents.
We use an ensemble of three classifiers to identify violence. To build the ensemble
we made extensive use of cross-validation with our training data to get an impression
of the likely out-of-sample performance and to refine what part of the text to focus
on, which classifiers to use and how to combine them. All three classifiers are built
by looking at the full text and headline. We use a simple Naı¨ve Bayes classifier and
two Random Forest classifiers with hyperparameters described in the Appendix D.
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This produces 3 different classifiers, indexed by k, which allow us to obtain for each
document, denoted by Di, three estimates of the probability that classifier k contains
news coverage of the type that interests us, denoted by Pˆk(Yi = 1|Di), where Yi is
an indicator denoting whether a given document Di is either covering violent events
with fatalities or violent events in which tourists were targeted.
Naı¨ve Bayes methods belong to the class of generative linear classifiers, is known
to perform well with textual data and sparse feature sets. Random Forests, on the
other hand, are particularly suitable to allow for non-linearities using smaller feature
sets. The only difference between our two Random Forests, is that in one of them we
first use Singular Value Decomposition (also referred to as Latent Semantic Analysis
which has recently been used in Iaria et al. (2018)) to reduce the dimensionality of
the feature space from (tens of) thousand of word counts features into a much lower
100-dimensional continuous score representation of individual documents Di. These
individual components are then used as numeric features in the construction of the
classification trees using the random forest formulation.
In cross validation on three folds our ensemble reaches an AUC of 0.95 and an
average precision of 0.85 for fatal violence and an AUC of 0.97 and average precision
of 0.65 for attacks on tourists. These are very good statistics but they come from
an evaluation of a balanced dataset and precision falls when we instead evaluate an
imbalanced sample. This is an important issue for spotting of violence against tourists
as this is a heavily imbalanced class even in the training data.
Classification Ensemble and Validation For classification purposes, we use a soft
voting ensemble method, i.e. we average our three different classification scores
Pˆk(Yi = 1|Di) according to the function:
1(Di) =
1 if [
1
3 ∑
3
k=1 Pˆk(Yi = 1 |Di)] > c
0 otherwise.
(1)
To chose the cutoff c in (1), we count how often the indicator, 1(Di) would have been
correct for different values of c within the training sample. The best for accuracy
would be to pick a cut-off of c = 0.5. But we know from cross-validation that preci-
12
sion suffers due to the imbalanced sample. We are concerned that we get too many
false positives and becomes meaningless. We therefore choose a higher cutoff which
provides 90 percent precision within our training sample.13 This cutoff gives us 16,906
news articles with fatal violence and 1,082 news with violence against tourists out of
over 450,000 articles.
To reduce measurement error we conducted some ex-post manual coding for the
classification of articles indicating violence against tourists. While our results are
robust to relying only on the machine-generated output, it is prudent to perform
such a manual check and some amount of ex-post refinement. We considered all
articles with an ensemble probability indicating violence against tourists above 0.75
along with the top 100 articles ranked by the ensemble estimate from in (1) all origin
sources.14 We set 1(Di) = 0 by hand if we find false positive and set 1(Di) = 1 if we
find false negatives. Of 1, 082 observations that were marked positive by the algorithm
we recoded 103 to negatives, implying that our method did indeed achieve a precision
of over 90 percent out-of-sample. In the almost 5,000 additional news items that were
hand-coded we only found an additional 608 positives with a rapidly declining rate
so that we suspect that the remaining articles will not contain a lot of actual positives.
After hand-coding we therefore have 1, 587 positives in over 450, 000 negatives that
feed into our media coverage-based measures of violence against tourists.
In the Online Appendix D we describe the classification approach in greater detail,
while appendix Tables B2 and B3 provide some sample headlines of articles coded as
covering violence and flagged up as capturing that tourists are targeted by a violent
event. In the appendix we also discuss the ”mistakes” made by the algorithm and
why they are often capturing something indicating risks to tourists. It is therefore
no surprise that our results, even in the most demanding specifications, are robust
to using only the raw 1(Di) that come out of our automated procedure and using
different cutoffs.
This is also important from a methodological perspective. We have managed to
13Our results are robust to using alternative cut-offs. In Appendix Table A6 we use both a higher
cut-off with 95 percent precision and the Bayes-optimal cut-off of 0.5.
14We do the latter to ensure that the model has not only fit to sources that emit a lot of news like
news agencies in Russia and China.
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provide a meaningful, fully-automated way to identify fatal violence and violence
against tourists even though they only appear in about 4 and 0.4 percent of all arti-
cles, i.e. are extremely rare. We did this simply by asking our research assistants to
code a subset of the articles - the classifier then automatically extracted the relevant
features from the data. Furthermore, our supervised learning approach allowed us to
check the error rate explicitly and to reduce it through setting hyperparameters and
building of the ensemble. This would not have been possible with an unsupervised
or dictionary-based method.
2.5 Patterns in the Reporting Data
Before turning to the full analysis, we document how the news reporting relates
to underlying events beginning with daily data. This provides evidence in support of
the underlying common trends assumption which matters in the empirical analysis
below where we require that reporting only occurs after an attack and not prior to
one.
Daily Data To look at patterns of news reporting around known events, we use
the GTD daily event data to construct a balanced panel at the dyad level covering
two week windows around each event. In total there are 3704 recorded events across
the five destinations. Given the 57 countries for which we have media coverage, the
balanced daily event-level dataset comprises 6.1 million rows.
This data layout allows us to explore the pattern of news reporting around known
events. One concern, following Jetter (2017)’s study of US media coverage, is that
news stories might precede (and even encourage) acts of violence within a time win-
dow (such as a week). This would show up in our data as increases in reporting
intensity before GTD events. To investigate this possibility, we estimate the following
empirical model:
phdt = αk + αhd + αt +
14
∑
τ=−14
(βτ × Timetoevente,t−τ) + ehdt
where e indexes a specific event, h and d indicate the reporting dyad, while t indicates
time which is now a daily observation. The above regression controls for event fixed
effects, αk, dyad fixed effects, αhd, and daily fixed effects, αt. In the case of multiple
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events in close temporal proximity, we would be double counting the reporting on
dyad {h, d}, and hence we adjust standard errors to allow for two-way clustering at
the level of the dyad and the event.
(Figure 3)
In Figure 3 we plot the point estimates βˆτ, which suggests that there is no antic-
ipatory element in the reporting data. Panels A and B show the measures generated
from our method for classifying articles. Specifically, we construct the share of articles
per day that are classified as reporting either fatal violence or tourists being attacked.
The patterns suggest a sharp increase in the share right after the event date. This
dissipates quite quickly with most reporting occurring on the day of the event and
for around two days afterwards. It is important to note that this happens despite the
fact that the total number of news stories increases slightly, i.e. we find this relative
reporting effect despite increased reporting overall.15
Monthly Aggregates In our analysis we use aggregates of our news measures
to the monthly level. Figure 4 reports the mean shares at a monthly frequency for
the four countries most affected by violence against tourists in our sample period
(Tunisia, Turkey, Israel and Egypt). It depicts the average share across all dyads of
monthly events defined by (1) for violence against tourists – the red dashed line with
the axis on the right hand side – and (1) for fatal violence on a monthly basis – the
blue solid line with the axis on the left hand side.
(Figure 4)
Figure 4 shows a lot of variation across time in reporting for all countries. But
there is also considerable variation in the intensity of reporting across destinations.
Reporting on violence is often a considerable part of reporting on Tunisia. At the
time of the Sousse attack, for example, violence against tourists occupied around 40
percent of all news. Reporting in Egypt, Turkey and Israel is more intense for fatal
violence than it is for violence against tourists. However, this coverage never occupies
15In Appendix A.1 we provide some further evidence shedding light on which event characteristics
are associated with, on average, more extensive media coverage.
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more than 10 percent of the news. The most extreme example is Israel where news
on violence never exceeds 7 percent of reporting and violence against tourists never
more than 3 percent.
3 Reduced-form Evidence
In this section, we present reduced-form evidence on the relationship between
spending and violence. We begin with country-level violence and then present the
findings with dyad-specific news coverage. Both sets of results show that there is a
highly robust relationship between aggregated spending and violence which depends
not only on violent events but how intensively they are covered by news media.
3.1 Country-level Violence
We begin by looking at the relationship between the (log of) spending by origin
country h in destination country d at date t, denoted by yhdt, and violent events using
the following specification:
yhdt = αhd + αht + αdm(t) + ξvhd,t−1 + εhdt (2)
where αhd are dyad fixed effects, αht are origin country/time fixed effects and αdm(t)
are destination/month of year fixed effects. The inclusion of origin country-time fixed
effects capture a range of seasonal, political and economic effects in the origin country
and the destination/month fixed effects capture seasonal patterns in spending in the
different destinations. The first set of fixed effects implies that we are effectively
looking at the rate of tourism spending from origin countries in the five different
destinations. Any fluctuation in the overall flow of spending into the region will be
absorbed by the home country/time fixed effect. In addition to aggregated spending
as an outcome variable, we will also consider the number of active cards on which
spending is happening as an outcome measure.
Our core violence measure, denoted by vhc,t−1, is lagged by one month to capture
the possibility that tourism reacts to past violence. We expect to find that ξ < 0 in
(2), i.e. violence deters spending. We use four sources of data on violent events at
the country level in different versions of (2). In order to make the magnitudes from
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different data sources comparable, we divide the right-hand-side variable measuring
violence by its respective standard deviation.
Table 2 reports regressions from the specification in (2) and shows compelling
evidence of a negative link between violence and card spending. Columns (1) through
(4) show that there is a significant correlation between all five measures of violence
and the level of tourism spending in a country. The size of the coefficients is in the
range of 4% to 7.6% decrease in spending for an increase of violence by one standard
deviation.
In Column (5) we try to get a more complete impression of the relationship be-
tween violence and spending using all available information from the different mea-
sures by combining nine different measures using a principal component analysis.
We then represent vhd,t−1 in (2) with a four dimensional vector comprising the first
four principal components, with the results reported in column (5). In line with the
results in columns (1) through (4), we find a robust negative relationship between
principal components 1, 2 and 4 and spending. In terms of magnitude, spending falls
by about 7% with an increase in the first component and by about 4% with the second
component. Since this summarizes information from a range of sources, we will use
this representation of violence in the analysis that follows.
Columns (6) - (10) show that we obtain similar results when using the log value of
number of active cards as the dependent variable. This is important as it indicates that
the main spending effect is coming from the extensive margin, i.e. the usage of cards
from origin countries in the destination countries rather than the average amount
spent per card.
(Table 2)
Together these results are consistent with the idea that violence may deter potential
tourists. Moreover, this is true even when we include, dyad, home country × time
and month effects in the specifications so that the effect of violence is relative to mean
dyad spending in a given month. The results are therefore not influenced by macro-
trends in the origin country (country in which the cards are issued).
To allay the concern that results based on (2) could be explained by different time
trends between times/places which experience violence and those that do not, we
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conducted an event-study which studies patterns in aggregated spending and the
number of active cards around known violent events. It is comforting to see in Ap-
pendix Figure A4 that there is no evidence of any anticipatory contraction of spending
or reduction in the number of active cards prior to an event taking place. On the con-
trary, we observe sharp contractions in card spending and the number of active cards
with a one month delay only after a violent GTD event occurs.
3.2 Exploiting Dyadic Variation in News Coverage
We now shift focus away from the violence data in an attempt to understand
whether there is a differential effect of media reporting about violence on tourist
activity. This allows us to explore dyad-specific responses to violence as mediated via
news coverage.
Core results The core specification in this section extends (2) to:
yhdt = αhd + αht + αdm(t) + ξ1nhdt−1 + ξ2vhct−1 + εhct (3)
where, as above, our independent variable is the (log of) tourism spending. In this
instance, we measure vhct−1 using the first four principal components of violence
across the seven violence measures used in the previous section; these capture more
than 90 percent of the variation in the country-level violence variables. The variable
nhdt−1 is our dyad-specific news variable.
In some specifications we will use αdt instead of αdm(t), i.e. we include destination
× time fixed effects. These fixed effects capture all variation at the destination/time
level including news events which are reported on with a common level of intensity
across origin countries. The relationship between news coverage and spending is then
identified through idiosyncratic variation in the intensity of news reporting across
origins.
Define Bhdt = ∑i∈hdt 1(Di) as the monthly count of negative news stories in dyad
(h.d) at date t, either about fatal violence or attacks on tourists, based on equation (1).
Then our core variable to represent news coverage in a dyad is
nhdt−1 =
Bhdt−1
Nhdt−1
(4)
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where Nhdt−1 is the count of all news stories featuring country d reported in our news
source for country h at date t − 1. Thus the variable in equation (4) reflects the
news coverage of violence as a share of all news. This captures the idea that news
coverage of violence affects tourists more when they are important relative to other
news. Thus, if bad news stories are swamped by other stories, they will have less
impact on tourism spending. We confirm this in section 3.2.
Before presenting the results, it is worth stressing that our analysis is only exploit-
ing within-dyad variation which absorbs all factors like distance or cultural factors.
In addition, we are including home country by time fixed effects, αht, de facto absorb-
ing a host of factors that may drive the level of tourism activity that is explained by
origin-country level idiosyncrasies (such as holiday periods, which may differ across
countries). In this way we are modelling the rate of tourism activity for a given des-
tination among our sample of five countries relative to the overall amount of tourism
originating in country h. Hence all magnitudes are based on comparing the attrac-
tiveness of our destinations compared to the other five destinations in our data rather
than other parts of the world. Thus, we are only able to say whether tourism to Turkey
decreased after the terror attacks in the country relative to Egypt, Israel, Tunisia and
Morocco. Arguably this is a conservative approach, since there could be reputational
externalities whereby tourists shy away from the entire region due to the turmoil in
one of our countries.
The results from estimating (3) are in Table 3 where the top panel (Panel A) is based
on news coverage of violence against tourists while the bottom panel (Panel B) is for
reporting on fatal violence in general. In columns (1) through (3) the independent
variable is the (log of) card spending. Column (1) of Panel (A) shows that if the share
of stories about tourist violence were to go from zero to one then tourism spending
would fall by 0.552 log points or 42 percentage points. This results holds up in column
(2) when we add the controls for violent events and the coefficient stays roughly
similar. Hence, news coverage is clearly containing valuable information over and
above that in the underlying violent events themselves.
Column (3) in Table 3 is our most demanding specification in which we control
for destination × time fixed effects. This set of fixed effects is collinear with any
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time varying factors at the destination level, such as macro-economic developments
or violence at the destination. As a result, in this specification we rely only on the
differential intensity in news reporting across different reporting countries. The coef-
ficient on the share of bad news (based on tourist violence) remains highly significant
although the coefficient in this saturated specification falls to 0.205 log points. This
continues to suggest that a significant part of the overall effect in columns (1) and (2)
is driven by pure news reporting. Note, that this also provides some evidence for the
idea that tourists are not perfectly informed as the same basic risks at a given desti-
nation trigger dramatically different responses depending on the news environment,
something which we return to below.
Columns (4) through (6) in panel A of Table 3 repeat the specifications in the
first three columns but with the log of active cards as the dependent variable. The
estimates are similar which is important as it indicates that the results on spending
are not only due to changes at the intensive margin in which tourism spend is less,
but rather on the extensive margin as fewer tourists travel to a country following
media-coverage of violent events.
Panel B of Table 3 repeats the specifications in Panel A except for measuring re-
porting on all fatal violence rather than just attacks against tourists. The coefficients
are only slightly smaller compared to those presented in panel A. We also find statis-
tically and economically significant relationships throughout although we lose statis-
tical significance in the most saturated specification in column (6). The results suggest
that differential intensities in media coverage of violence may have an important in-
dependent direct effect on tourism travel and spending, which is particularly relevant
given that violence more broadly, not necessarily directed at tourists, is a lot more
common.16
(Table 3)
Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that the media have the capacity to
influence tourism spending. The fact that news reporting has a negative correlation
16A horse race combining both of these measures together suggests that we find negative and sta-
tistically as well as economically significant coefficients for both news measures, suggesting that our
news measures are not simply picking up the same type of news. These results are available upon
request.
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with tourism spending, even when controlling for an array of fixed effects and more
objective measures of violence, shows that specific reporting matters over and above
the violence itself. That said, it is hard to quantify the relative importance of violence
and news from the reduced form analysis. In section 4 we therefore provide a model
of tourist perceptions, news and violence which allows us to distinguish the news
effect much more carefully from the effect of violence.
Further Results This section provides additional results which lend further support
for the idea that intense reporting on violence can impact tourism spending. We
also address concerns about reverse causality by using the composition of victims by
nationality as an instrument for the intensity of news coverage.
News Coverage Intensity So far, we have assumed that the effect of bad news,
Bhdt−1, on tourism is weaker when a lot of other news about a country appear at the
same time, i.e. that relative frequency Bhdt−1Nhdt−1 is the right measure to use. One reason
to do this is to lower measurement error given the large variation of Nhdt−1 in the
sources we have in our data. But it will also play a crucial role in the theory-based
approach that we propose in section 4.
Table 4 presents a range of specifications testing for relative news effects. In Panel
A we analyze news reporting on violence against tourists. We first explore the differ-
ence between using the count and the share of news coverage by including both in
equation (3). The coefficient on the relative measure essentially unchanged compared
to column (2) of Table 3. We get an additional effect from the number of bad news,
Bhdt−1, but this it is small in size - bad news items lower spending by 0.7 percentage
points the following month. In column (2) we control for violent events using the four
principal violence components.
In columns (3) and (4) we explore how violence intensity matters by constructing a
dummy variable for whether news reporting is in different quartiles of the distribution
of dyad/months with Bhdt−1 > 0. We find a striking pattern in which spending falls
continuously with increasing relative reporting intensity. This is direct support for
the idea that it is reporting intensity as captured by Bhdt−1Nhdt−1 that impacts the tourism
spending response. The top quartile experiences a drop of tourism spending of over
25 percentage points whereas the lowest quarter essentially shows no effect.
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In Panel B of Table 4 we find the same pattern of coefficients for news reporting on
fatal violence. Here, only the relative intensity measures reduces spending and spend-
ing falls with higher quartiles. The coefficients are also lower with an 11 percentage
point drop in the top quartile where there are now a lot more dyad/month observa-
tions. The overall damage of these news stories on spending remains economically
important.
(Table 4)
Timing Remember that reporting on violence focuses on very recent events. To
capture the dynamic effects of news we can therefore use simple lags and forwards
on our main variable, nhdt−1. We show such an analysis in Figure 5. Panel A shows
that the coefficients on leads and lags on the tourism news count and Panel B shows
the coefficients on leads and lags of the fatal stories news count.
Figure 5 suggests that there is a strong negative effect which starts with the news
story and intensifies in the first few months afterwards.17 In addition, we don’t see
significant effects on spending leading up to violent events inspite of the fact that
such events do tend to be serially correlated. In Panel B we observe that lagged
effects persist for some time and that spending does not appear to recover fully. This
is consistent with long term effects of violence that have been remarked upon in the
macroeconomic literature (Mueller, 2012).
(Figure 5)
These patterns suggest that either perceptions are extremely sticky or that can-
cellation and search costs imply that tourists who perceived a country as dangerous
when booking their holiday are unlikely to switch back to that destination even when
the situation has calmed down. To get a more quantifiable sense of the lagged effects
of news reporting we model the share of tourists that take a decision regarding their
holiday destination explicitly in section 4.
17Note, however, that we often have different important events following one after another so not
too much weight should be put on these coefficients.
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An IV Approach One possible concern is that there are common forces driving
reporting and tourism spending if, as terrorists strategically consider their targets to
give them maximum media exposure. Another concern is also measurement error
since we proxy the news landscape at origin by only one or (at most) two newspaper
sources.
We now propose a way of addressing this via an IV approach which uses the
nationalities of victims of violence as an instrument. The idea is that demand for
reporting on an event increases dramatically if those who are exposed to news stories
empathize more with the victims. This may lead to more intensive reporting in the
country of origin of the victims and in countries which are ”similar” to the origin
country of the victims e.g. share a common language or are in the same region.18
For a subset of events, we were able to identify the nationality of the individuals
killed. If we assume that the distribution of casualties by nationality is random con-
ditional on an attack occurring and our fixed effects, then we can use the composition
of casualties by country as an instrument for news coverage on a specific dyad. The
Sousse attack serves as motivating evidence as shown in Figure 1, since it is notable
that while the bulk of casualties was British, 24 of reported fatalities were non-British.
For each attack where we have relevant data, we construct a variable, zhdt to denote
the nationalities of the casualties. To amplify power we also construct a version of the
measure that attributes casualties from nations to their contiguous neighbors or to
countries that share a common language. We then run a first stage regression to
explain news reporting on a dyad with the structure of casualties
nhdt−1 = αhd + αht + αdt + υzhdt−1 + ζhct. (5)
In Table 5 we present the results from the IV regression using our violence against
tourists based news measure in columns (1) - (3) and the general news measure in-
dicating violence with fatalities in columns (4)-(6). Panel A reports the first stage
regression based on equation (5) while Panels B and C report second-stage IV regres-
18This is not a new idea. Adams (1986) already observed the dramatic differences in reporting
depending on the nationality of the victims. Singer and Endreny (1993) contrast, for example, reporting
in the US on the heart defect of an american infant compared to reporting on a famine in Ethiopia.
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sions with either the log of spending or the log of active cards as the independent
variables.
(Table 5)
In column (1) of Panel A we confirm the idea that having a causality from the
country in question significantly predicts news coverage in a dyad. Column (2), also
counts casualties for contiguous countries, the region of origin (e.g. West Europe,
Northern Europe, etc.) and whether they are from a country speaking the same main
language. Thus, for example, a British victim may also influence potential tourism
in Ireland. We see that these are also strongly significant in predicting news cover-
age and the F-test on the instruments is, not surprisingly, much larger. Column (3)
shows that an instrumentation based solely on the indirect exposure, i.e. contiguity,
or sharing the same language together predict news coverage in a dyad quite well.19
In Panel B, we show that using the IV approach, there is a robust and negatively
significant effect of the share of news stories on the log of card spending. In all
cases, we include violence controls, origin/time and destination/month fixed effects.
In all cases we find negative coefficients which are much larger than for the OLS.
This could be explained by attenuation bias and/or by interpreting the coefficient as
a LATE effect where our instrument is picking up something particular about events
with identifiable casualties. There are arguments for both. First, we have some dyads
for which we have no or little reporting and the news landscape at the origin might
indeed look different than what we capture. Second, the coefficients increase much
more in size for fatal violence which makes sense as we are now indirectly imposing
fatal violence which affected foreigners, i.e. the LATE effect is driven by terrorism
instead of military operations. Panel C shows that these results become even more
robust when we look at the (log of) active cards as the independent variable.
Taken together, these results increase our confidence in our interpretation of the
results as indicative of a causal effect of news coverage in tourist perceptions that
depends on origin-specific reporting of violence. And it makes sense that idiosyn-
19This approach is similar to Persson and Tabellini (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2019) who instrument
for democracy using democracy in neighbouring countries.
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cratic differences in reporting in dyads represent more than variation in objective risk
factors faced by tourists.
Robustness In Panels A and B of Appendix Figure A5 we show that our results for
violence against tourists are broadly carried by all the different destination countries
we study. However, there does appear to be a larger effect for Tunisia, which saw
much more violence targeted at tourists.20 In columns (1) - (4) of Appendix Table A6
we highlight that the results are robust to controlling for dyad-specific linear trends,
in addition to destination specific non-linear time trends. We can also control for
time-varying exchange rate movements at the dyad level, some of which may be
triggered by changes in tourism-based revenues, and find that results are broadly the
same. We further show that the results are robust to using alternative cutoffs for the
classification of individual articles in the news corpus for which we did not deploy
hand-coding. Results are in columns (5) - (8) and are robust except for the lax cutoff
with destination time fixed effects. They are also robust to using our cutoff with 90
percent precision without hand-coding. This highlights that using the output of the
machine learning method we deploy even without the hand-coding refinement would
have led to very similar results.
4 Quantifying the Economic Impact of News Coverage
In this section we provide quantitative estimates of the impact of violent news
coverage on tourism spending based on a model of belief formation. We first present
a statistical model of violence, news reporting and tourism spending which we fit
to the aggregated spending data. After estimating the parameters of the model, we
simulate a news “shock” under different conditions and separate the effect of violence
from media reporting about the violence. We also show that the model can do a
better job than the reduced-form approach at capturing the timing and magnitude of
expenditure fluctuations.
It is intuitively obvious that having stories about fatalities or targeting of tourists is
unlikely to be positive for potential visitors who are considering visiting a destination.
20In Figure A5 we do not include the event-controls. Once these are included, Turkey does not show
an additional media effect which indicates that reporting on Turkey had relatively fewer outliers but
happened more proportional to violent events.
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And the reduced-form results confirm this intuition. But it is not the violence per
se that matters since that is already in the past when tourism spending is affected.
Violence could matter for two main reasons. First, it could negatively influence beliefs
about the general character of a holiday or business destination if violence is treated
as a signal about an underlying state. Second, it could be that tourists book their
travel in advance so that beliefs in the past affect spending today. In general, the
causal chain that this suggests is from acts of violence to changes in beliefs and hence
in behavior.
To form beliefs tourists have to get their information from somewhere. Some may
trawl a range of sources close to what those who assemble data bases like researchers
who compile GTD or GDELT do. But others may simply rely on domestic news
sources of the kind that that we have leveraged to get our dyad-specific news coverage
measure. A priori we do not know what the mix of such behaviors is likely to be
and the reduced-form results tell us little about this. This section therefore develops
a model that aims to combine violent events, reporting, tourist beliefs and tourism
activity. The key assumption that allows us to tie these three together is that both
reporting and violence are representations of a latent state. This allows us to derive a
more objective measure of the relative importance of the effect of events vis-a-vis the
news reporting on these events on tourism activity.
In our model potential tourists form beliefs before deciding where and when to
travel. Whether tourists observe the violent events directly or rely on news reporting
will lead to different estimates of the probability that a destination is safe. We will
allow a weighted average of these two estimates to predict the tourism spending data
and estimate the weight that best fits the data.
The model of belief formation also allows us to estimate weights on how past be-
liefs affect contemporaneous tourist activity. The focus on past beliefs is motivated
by the mechanics of how tourists make their travel arrangements, which typically im-
ply a non-negligible delay between the booking date and the beliefs held at that time
and the actual travel date, from which point onwards tourism spending is reflected
in the aggregated spending data. We allow for a lagged effect of up to nine months
and estimate the weights on these lags that best fit the data. The results show that
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a structured model of beliefs based on Bayesian updating with these features does a
good job at capturing the pattern of changes in tourism spending in response to news
and violence.
The model has some features that are standard, i.e. using core features of Bayesian
updating. However, we use two non-standard ingredients motivated by the psychol-
ogy literature: categorical thinking and biases in information sources.
We posit that individuals are categorical thinkers, trying to evaluate whether a
given destination is safe or dangerous and form beliefs about the probability that this
is the case. There is a wealth of evidence from psychology that people crave such
crude categories when making sense of the world.21 This is one among a range of
heuristics and biases highlighted in Tversky and Kahneman (1974).22 We therefore
posit that potential tourists classify countries as either safe or dangerous, forming a
judgment about the probability that a country is safe or dangerous for tourists.
There are many different sources of information that a potential tourist could use
to research the safety of a holiday destination. Relying only on news reporting in the
respective home countries is likely to give only a partial picture, albeit one that can
be learned at low cost. However, many individuals may lack the capacity or desire
to collect and use all available information and simply take news coverage in their
home country at face value.23This can produce biased beliefs about the actual safety
of danger of a destination since as we have seen, the same event is reported with
different degrees of intensity in different countries.
To operationalize this, we suppose that there are two categories (safe and dan-
gerous) and two kinds of tourists (naı¨ve and sophisticated). The latter look at the
underlying data on violent incidents and use this to update their beliefs while naı¨ve
tourists rely solely on destination-specific news coverage from their home country.
This allows us to model the reaction to news and reporting in a uniform framework
in which reporting is modelled as providing useful but imperfect signals about the
21Fiske (1998) provides a review of social psychology literature; Fryer and Jackson (2008) provide a
model based on this idea and a discussion of the biases that this induces in decision-making.
22Bordalo et al. (2016) provides a nice overview of different approaches.
23Handel and Schwartzstein (2018) provide an overview of the literature. A large literature in psy-
chology focuses on so-called availability heuristics, the tendency to judge probabilities by the ease with
which the information can be recalled Tversky and Kahneman (1973).
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underlying categorical state.24
4.1 The Model
Core Features Suppose that destination country d at date t is characterized by a
state, sdt where sdt = 1 denotes a dangerous destination and sdt = 0 denotes a sa f e
destination. At each date t, Pˆhdt is the belief that a destination country d is dangerous
as perceived by potential tourists in country h. Due to different dates at which people
book their travel spending is determined by a weighted average of past beliefs. Hence
we suppose that equation (3) is replaced by:
yhdt = αhd + αht + αdm + ξ
−9
∑
τ=−1
ωτ Pˆhdt+τ + εhct (6)
where ωτ is the weight on each lagged value, i.e. at date τ. Equation (6) also has
the same fixed effects as equation (3). In this framework, ndht and vht affect spending
through affecting beliefs Pˆhdt. Since we do not directly observe beliefs, we develop a
theory-based approach which posits that
Pˆhdt = Γ (Ψhdt,Ωdt)
for some function Γ (·) where Ψhdt is the history of news reporting up to date t and
Ωdt is the history of violent events up to date t. Note, that only Ψhdt varies at the dyad
level.
Sophisticated Tourists Tourists that we label as “sophisticated” are assumed to read
multiple data sources or browse an array of relevant web sites to gather their informa-
tion. Since this information is not confined to being resident in any specific country
of origin, we suppose that such potential tourists have common beliefs. We there-
fore suppose that they estimate the probability that a country is safe or dangerous by
observing Ωdt.
The empirical model that we use for this is based on Besley and Mueller (2012) and
Besley et al. (2015) who suppose that the underlying state can be modeled as a Markov
24We do not allow for individuals to control their fear (see Becker and Rubinstein, 2011). Yet, it is
entirely plausible, even likely, that differences in reporting intensity capture some of this effect.
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process which switches between being dangerous and safe. Assume that our measure
of violent events is distributed normally i.e., vdt ∼ N(µsd, σ2sd). This allows the mean,
µsd, and the variance, σ
2
sd to vary with the state sdt. At each date, there can be a
transition between states where pd is the probability of transitioning from dangerous
to safe and qd is the probability of transitioning form safe to dangerous. This gives
a parameter vector for the model with six elements for each destination country d,
summarized as θd =
{
µ0d, σ
2
0d, µ1d, σ
2
1d, pd, qd
}
. This vector can be estimated from the
data on violent incidents using an EM algorithm (see Hamilton, 1990) which is now
implemented in STATA .
The belief of the sophisticated tourists that a destination is dangerous at time t is
then given by
Πdt = Pr(sdt = 1 | Ωdt, θˆd), (7)
which is based on the estimated parameter vector θˆd and violence history available in
t, Ωdt. This belief is updated using Bayes rule as information is revealed, i.e.
Πdt =
Et−1 [Πdt]
Et−1 [Πdt] + [1− Et−1 [Πdt]] γ (vdt)
where γ (vdt) =
φ(vdt|0)
φ(vdt|1) is the likelihood ratio derived from the normal distribution
densities and where
Et−1 [Πdt] = Πdt−1 ∗ pd + (1−Πdt−1) ∗ (1− qd)
is the prior from the previous period. For vdt, we use the principal components across
the data from different violence sources.25 Together these make up the elements of
the history Ωdt. However, as with any Bayesian approach, the prior history is fully
captured by beliefs up to t − 1. Estimates of θˆd which go into constructing (7) are
reported in Appendix Table A7. They show strong persistence in the state in all five
destination countries.
Figure 6 gives the estimates of Πdt for Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and Israel. This
approach permits a classification of whether a country is deemed to be dangerous or
25To aggregate the different components into one number, vdt, we use the point estimates on the first
two components from Table 2.
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safe based on the level of violence but in a country-specific manner. Thus, unlike
equation (2), the effect of a given change in vdt is heterogeneous across different des-
tinations depending the history and persistence of violence. This makes sense; what
would be deemed to be violence pointing to a state of danger in, say, Israel (bottom
right) is different from what would be considered danger in Tunisia (top right). These
differences show up in the estimates of µsd. The probabilities based on equation (7)
indicate that Tunisia was the first of our destinations to become dangerous based on
the level of violence and this was followed by Egypt and Turkey. Danger in Israel
based on this method is less persistent.26 Crucially, objective risk estimates, as dis-
played in Figure 6 show dramatic differences to the news coverage we displayed in
Figure 4.
(Figure 6)
Naı¨ve Tourists To obtain the observed dyadic heterogeneity from our model, we
postulate that there are “naı¨ve” tourists who use only information based on news
coverage in their own country, i.e. Ψhdt. We suppose that they base their judgements
on news coverage about violence against tourists in their home country. To model their
beliefs let the state s be associated with a fraction of news stories reporting violence
of ηs and the distribution of Bhdt and Nhdt follows a negative binomial distribution
based on this share given by:27
f (Bhdt, Nhdt | s) =
 Nhdt
Bhdt
 (ηs)Bhdt (1− ηs)(Nhdt−Bhdt) . (8)
To obtain an estimate of ηs from the data we use our estimate of Πdt and the news
data. Specifically
ηˆs =
∑hdt Πdt
[
Bhdt
Nhdt
]
∑hdt Πdt
,
26The model fits less well for Morocco since the differences in µsd are minimal between what the
model picks as the two categorical states.
27We use the negative binomial distribution to capture the fact that news reporting has extremely fat
tails. The distribution could be justified by a stopping rule for media consumption but we follow it
purely for pragmatic reasons.
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where summation is over all dyads and time periods. In effect, this is a weighted sum
of the news share variable used in the reduced-form approach with dyad specific
variation. Note, that we therefore assume that naive tourists do not know what Πdt
is in each period but they know that newspapers will tend to report differently in
dangerous situations. The further ηˆ1 is from ηˆ0 the more can naive tourists learn from
the news. We find that ηˆ1 = 0.022 and ηˆ0 = 0.002, i.e. tourists can learn something
regarding the underlying state by observing that more than about 1 percent of news
is bad news.
Naı¨ve tourists then use the likelihood ratio based only on news:
λ (Bhdt, Nhdt) =
f (Bhdt, Nhdt|0)
f (Bhdt, Nhdt|1) (9)
to update their beliefs. Their belief that a country is dangerous is given by
pihdt = Pr(sdt = 1 | Ψhdt, θˆd, ηˆd0, ηd1).
which, again, evolves according to a recursion based on Bayes rule
pidt =
Et−1 [pidt]
Et−1 [pidt] + [1− Et−1 [pidt]] λ (Bhdt, Nhdt)
where, as before, Et−1 [pidt] is derived from the Markov chain governing the underly-
ing categorical state.
One of the key predictions from this model is that observing non-violent news re-
porting about a country will lead potential tourists to update their belief that a coun-
try is safe. As ηˆ1 > ηˆ0, tourists will increase the probability that they attach to a
place being dangerous if Bhdt increases. However, since ηˆ0 > 0 news about violence
against tourists does not immediately give away to believing that a destination is un-
safe. Context matters and the non-linearity of the model implies that there is a natural
“tipping point” in equation (9) as a function of Bhdt relative to Nhdt at which tourists
attach a much larger probability to a country being dangerous. This feature of the
model allows it to account for the sharp changes in beliefs in response to news that
are needed to explain patterns in the spending data.
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In our model both sophisticated and naı¨ve tourists care about the same underlying
state when deciding on their holidays. It is only their information set that differs. In
this way we have tied together objective violence as a manifestation of the state and
news reporting as an informative signal of the state. In the appendix we show that
there is a relationship between the objective true state and the posterior belief held
by naı¨ve tourists.28 But beliefs based on news also deviate from those based on the
history of violence. Such differences are interesting and show why, through the lens
of the model, news reporting generates dyad-specific beliefs.
4.2 Fitting the Model
Putting all elements of the model together, the beliefs of tourists overall are a
weighted average of both types of tourists. Specifically, we suppose tourist spending
depends on
Pˆhdt = χΠdt + (1− χ)pihdt (10)
where the parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the proportions of potential tourists who are
sophisticated (as opposed to naı¨ve). In addition we assume that there are different
points in time at which tourists book their holidays so that the overall relevant beliefs
are given by ∑−9τ=0 ωτ Pˆhdt−τ. Substituting equation (10) into (6) yields the following
empirical specification:
yhdt = αhd + αht + αdm + ξ
−9
∑
τ=0
ωτ (χΠdt−τ + (1− χ)pihdt−τ) + εhct. (11)
The model-based approach differs from equations (2) and (3) in three ways. First, the
belief estimates, (Πdt,pihdt), are both heterogeneous across countries and non-linear in
their responsiveness to violence and news data. Second they depend on the entire his-
tory of violence rather one period lagged values and third, they allow a lag structure
to reflect the timing of travel decisions. At the same time the weights (ω,χ) reflect
the importance of different kinds of tourist behavior for overall spending.
Table 6 explores how well our estimates of the two sets of constructed beliefs
28Appendix Figure A6 reports the posterior distribution of pidt for months that we classify as rel-
atively dangerous (Πdt > 12 ) and safe (Πdt ≤ 12 ) destination/months. Both distributions have full
support but the density of pidt has a much thicker tail during dangerous months.
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{Πdt,pihdt} explain variations in aggregated spending. In column (1) of Table 6, we
report the relationship between aggregated spending and Πdt−1, i.e. supposing that
χ = 1 and ω−1 = 1 in equation (10). On average, spending falls by about 20.8 percent
when beliefs Πdt−1 increase from 0 to 1, i.e. when a destination goes from being
viewed as completely safe to completely dangerous. This magnitude is in the same
ballpark as the reduced-form results reported in Table 2. But unlike the estimates
based on (2), recall that Πdt−1 moves as in Figure 6 and therefore reacts much more
strongly to some changes in violence than others. Moreover, effects coming through
Πdt−1 are also naturally heterogeneous across destination countries.
(Table 6)
Column (2) focuses on responsiveness of spending to pihdt−1, i.e. imposing χ = 0
and ω−1 = 1. We now get a fall of 36.4 percent if the news-based belief that a
destination country is dangerous within a dyad moves from 0 to 1. This is true even
though most dyads with high values of pihdt also have high values of Πdt so that
these two effects are complements with pihdt increasing the intensity of the impact
of violence on tourism spending. In column (3) we estimate pihdt based on news
reporting on fatalities rather than targeting tourists. And although, as in the reduced-
form results, the impact of news reporting is somewhat smaller in magnitude, it
moves in the same direction.
We now explore the weights that give the best fit to the data using a grid search
over the weights in equation (11) to maximize goodness of fit.29 We find that ωˆ0 =
ωˆ1 = 0.2 so that 20 percent of spending is driven by contemporaneous beliefs and 20
percent are coming from the first lag. After that, the weight based on the best fit falls
(the weight sequence is 0.15, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05). We find that the weight
on sophisticated tourists that best fits the data is χˆ = 0.4, i.e. two in five tourists are
sophisticated. We will use these estimates of the weights and ξˆ to quantify the impact
of news on spending in the next section.
Putting this together, we find that “optimal” weighted average reported in column
(4) suggests that if all tourists switched their categorical beliefs that a destination is
29See Appendix B for more details.
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dangerous from zero to one, then spending would fall by about 75 percent. Of course,
this is quite an extreme thought experiment but perhaps not so extreme when we
think of the cases such as Tunisia where there were quick upticks in violence that
could not reasonably have been anticipated by potential tourists.
4.3 Simulation of a News Shock
A crucial difference between sophisticated and naı¨ve approaches to belief forma-
tion in the model is that the probability that a destination is more likely to be re-
garded as safe by naı¨ve tourists if there is more non-violent (other) news coverage,
i.e. Nhdt − Bhdt. Figure 7 illustrates the role of other news by considering an outbreak
of violence on tourists (at date 0) which changes beliefs from Πd,−1 = 0 to Πd,0 = 1
for one month. This yields the dashed line in both panels of Figure 7. The immediate
effect is that the 20 percent of tourists which react immediately to danger (ω0 = 0.2)
do not travel to the destination and tourism spending falls by around six percentage
points. The dashed line shows the persistent effect on tourism spending, i.e. the effect
of Πd,0 = 1 falls only slowly because most tourists book their travel in advance.
(Figure 7)
We then show the additional impact of news reporting in a scenario in which this
switch in the sophisticated beliefs is accompanied by bad news Bhd0 = 1. To illustrate
the importance of other news, Nhdt − Bhdt, we contrast two levels of background re-
porting Nhd0 ∈ {0, 100}. Panel A shows the effect of bad news on tourism spending
with no other news, Nhdt = 0, is a further eight percentage points in spending. Again,
because tourists book their holidays in advance this effect persists. However, with
Nhd0 = 100, the news about tourist violence is “drowned out” by other news and the
impact of Bhd0 = 1 is reduced dramatically. This kind of scenario is not atypical of the
reporting landscape for tourist violence in a country like Israel where there is a lots
of other news coverage.
This vividly illustrates the importance of background news in “distracting” tourists
or “putting things into perspective” for tourists when they rely exclusively on news
coverage to form their beliefs - even when such tourists update using Bayes rule. The
bias in their beliefs is due to their failing to explore a wider set of news sources. By
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restricting their updating to domestic news sources, their beliefs are biased in a simi-
lar way to what would happen if tourists were to update using the model of Bordalo
et al. (2016) in which destination countries are stereotyped as dangerous if they are
covered by bad news even without any other background news coverage.
4.4 The Aggregate Economic Impact of Reporting
To quantify the news effect we can contrast the average effect that is coming from
sophisticated tourists, ξˆ ∑−9τ=0 ωˆτχˆΠˆdt−τ, and the overall effect, ξˆ ∑
−9
τ=0 ωˆτ Pˆhdt−τ. We
can think of the difference between these two as the news effect, ξˆ ∑−9τ=0 ωˆτ (1− χˆ) pˆidt−τ.
In Figure 8 we show the effect based on beliefs of sophisticated tourists using a grey
line and the overall effect as a black line.
The left-hand panel in Figure 8 shows the results for Tunisia which shows that
a large part of the variability in tourism spending comes from belief change by so-
phisticated tourists, i.e. is not dyad-specific. However, there is a visible news effect
and in 2015 it alone is responsible for a spending decline of about 15 percent. This
illustrates the influence that reporting may have had a dramatic impact on tourism
for Tunisia in that year. In the right-hand Panel we show the same data for Egypt.
Again, we get some news effect but it is nowhere nearly as large as the main effect
from sophisticated tourists. This is a dramatic illustration of the crowding out effect
that we illustrated in Figure 7.
(Figure 8)
The estimates in Figure 8 suggest material losses to the economy in all four coun-
tries that we study. The World Bank reports that tourism revenues in 2010 were 3.48
Billion USD in Tunisia, 5.6 Billion USD in Israel, 13.63 Billion USD in Egypt and 26.3
billion USD in Turkey. Back of the envelope calculations based on the estimates in this
section indicate losses between 2011 and 2016 of over 35 billion USD due to violence
with in excess of 10 billion USD being due to negative news reporting.30 That said,
Egypt and Tunisia are predicted to have recovered the losses towards the end of the
sample period.
30For calculations see the Appendix C.
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Figure 9 explores how well the model-based approach fits the data. The left-hand
panel illustrates the predicted effect, averaged over all origin countries, for Tunisia
based on (11) and compares it to the spending residuals. The model captures both
the early decline and recovery at the beginning of the Arab spring. However, the
most striking observation is for 2015 where it accurately captures both the decline
and recovery in spending.
(Figure 9)
The model-based prediction compares favorably with that from the reduced-form
model as shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 9. For this we use the estimated
effects, ξ1nhdt−1 + ξ2vhct−1 averaged over origin countries based on Table 3. Although
some of the broad patterns are visible, the fit to the data is notably inferior to that in
the left-hand panel, failing to reproduce the timing and magnitude of the fluctuations
in spending. This is particularly noticeable during the Arab spring and getting the
timing right in sudden expenditure declines in 2015. Thus Figure 9 supports the utility
of an approach which models patterns of belief formation alongside a reduced-form
approach.
5 Conclusions
The core finding of the paper is that there is a robust negative relationship be-
tween violence, reporting on violence and tourism spending based on a sample of
five destination and fifty-seven origin countries. This is established leveraging novel
data sources on both aggregated spending and news coverage. A key finding is that
the effect of violence and news coverage varies markedly across both destination and
origin countries. To explain this, we have fitted a specific model of belief formation to
study patterns in the data. In the best fit to the data, we find that about a third of the
weight in terms of updating beliefs comes from country-specific news reporting but
there is significant heterogeneity across countries and events.
The paper contributes to an emerging literature which explores the power of the
media in influencing economic decisions. Citizens rely heavily on the media as a
source of information when deciding where and when to travel. Our supervised ma-
chine learning method of identifying specific negative news linked to violent events
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allowed us to study this. We find that there is significant country-level heterogeneity
in responses to violence are attributable to negative news reporting. In particular, we
find that sudden slumps in spending with gradual recovery are best explained by a
media effect. The media is indeed powerful in affecting international flows of tourists.
It is often claimed that perceptions matter for more than tourism. Negative cover-
age of the prospects for African countries create a climate of opinion among corporate
boards and shareholders which could affect the allocation of FDI. This is particularly
poignant in an era where social media and the potential for fake news is attracting
increasing attention and for a region which is economically not well integrated (Rouis
and Tabor, 2012). How far news biases have real aggregate economic consequences
has yet to be studied but is ripe for investigation.
The basic ideas and methods developed here can be extended to a number of
additional contexts. We have cautiously identified the effects of violence and its
reporting within a set of five countries. But this leaves open the question of whether
tourists divert their spending to other countries or even choose to stay at home. So
there can be gainers and losers from violence. To study this would require aggregated
spending data from a broader range of destination countries. We have also looked at
quite extreme violent events because their news effect is easier to identify. It would
be interesting to look at other forms of crime perpetrated on tourists. This too could
have an impact on tourism via a news reporting channel. For this, destinations such
as the Caribbean and Latin America would be particularly interesting.
Finally, our paper contributes to wider debates about forces that could lead to a re-
versal in globalization. Given that increased international travel has been a significant
component of global integration, determinants of tourism are important not just in
terms of generating traditional economic gains from trade but also in creating greater
cross-cultural understanding. To the extent that security concerns increase the per-
ceived costs of travel, politics may therefore have an important impact on this aspect
of international integration. And the results in this paper suggest that how the media
chooses to report these risks has a role to play in this process.
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Figure 1: Overall aggregated spending patterns of British- and German-issued cards
in Tunisia in the wake of the Sousse attack)
Notes: The solid black line presents residuals of a regression of the log of aggregated card spending removing destination
country fixed effects as well as destination-specific seasonality. The other two lines plot residuals of a regression of the log card
spend for German- and British-issued cards in Tunisia over time, having removed dyad fixed effects, issuing country by time
fixed effects and destination by month fixed effects. The drop in tourism spending is markedly larger for British-issued cards.
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Figure 2: Map of countries included in our estimation samples across the exercises
Notes: Figure indicates the origin countries included in our estimating sample. Dark-shaded are countries for which both newspaper and aggregated spending data is available,
lightly shaded areas are countries for which only aggregated spending data is available.
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Figure 3: GTD Events and Reporting Activity: No evidence of diverging pre-trends prior to events
Panel A: Share of articles classified as indicating fatalities Panel B: Share of articles indicating tourist targeted
Notes: Figure plots point estimates from a regression that absorbs event, reporting dyad and day fixed effects. The plotted point estimates capture the timing of reporting on a
dyad specific to the timing of an individual event recorded in the GTD dataset. 90% confidence intervals obtained from clustering standard errors at the dyad level are indicated.
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Figure 4: Average Share of Articles on Fatal Violence and Violence Against Tourists
Notes: Figure plots the time series variation in the share of (any) fatal violence or on violence directed towards tourists across four main countries.
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Figure 5: Leads and Lagged Effect of Tourist Violence on Tourism Spending
Panel A: News on tourist being targeted Panel B: News on any fatal violence
Notes: Figure plots the effect of different leads and lags of the main tourist violence measure on card spending. The underlying regression controls for dyad fixed effect,
issuing-country by time fixed effect and destination by month. 95% confidence bands obtained from clustering the data at the dyad level are indicated.
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Figure 6: Markov Chain Fitted Probability of Danger Across Sample Countries
Notes: Figures plot out the probability of danger as implied by the fitted Markov chain across the four main tourist destinations in our data.
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Figure 7: Simulated effect of violent news shock and moderating impact of other news
coverage)
Notes: The figure plots out the model-implied impact of a violent event (dashed line). The solid grey line presents the total
effect that incorporates the media-coverage effect with 100 other news items on topics unrelated to violence. The solid black line
presents the total effect if there is no other media coverage, attenuating the impact on beliefs.
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Figure 8: Tunisia and Egypt model-based effects
Panel A: Tunisia Panel B: Egypt
Notes: Figure plots the overall model-based impact of violent news shocks on tourism spending for Tunisia (left) and Egypt (right). The solid black line presents the total effect
while the grey line presents the effect implied by modelled sophisticated tourists.
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Figure 9: Comparison of model- and reduced-form implied effects on tourism spending in Tunisia
Panel A: Model based Panel B: Reduced form
Notes: The left figure plots mean of the model-based estimated effect on tourism spending against the patterns in the average residualized data after removing dyad-, origin-by-
time and destination by month fixed effects. The right figure plots the same residuals against the implied mean reduced effects that would be captured in a pure reduced-form
regression studied, for example, in Table 3.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Observations
ACLED Events 0.612 0.934 31212
UCDP Events 0.278 0.968 55620
GTD Events 0.404 0.904 55620
ICEWS armed violence events 0.627 0.925 55105
GDELT armed violence events 0.718 0.983 49440
News on tourists targeted (count of articles) 0.035 0.856 30495
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) 0.002 0.033 30495
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) 0.015 0.068 30495
Any tourist killed 0.001 0.031 61800
Same region x Any Casualties 0.006 0.075 61800
Common language x Any Casualties 0.007 0.082 61800
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Table 2: Effect of Country-level Violence measured by different event data sets on tourism spending and active cards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Spending) log(Cards)
UCDP Events -0.040*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.008)
GTD Events -0.075*** -0.076***
(0.017) (0.016)
ICEWS armed violence events -0.068*** -0.054***
(0.020) (0.019)
GDELT armed violence events -0.065*** -0.047***
(0.016) (0.015)
Armed violence component 1 -0.067*** -0.053***
(0.017) (0.017)
Armed violence component 2 -0.041*** -0.034**
(0.014) (0.015)
Armed violence component 3 0.018 0.010
(0.015) (0.015)
Armed violence component 4 -0.031** -0.039***
(0.013) (0.014)
Observations 42268 42268 42268 42268 42268 42313 42313 42313 42313 42313
R2 .947 .947 .947 .947 .947 .969 .97 .969 .969 .97
Dest./Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination by time level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables are lagged by one month to
account for the lagged response of tourism to events. We also divide all explanatory variables by their standard deviation so that the coefficients can be interpreted as
the response of spending to one standard deviation increase in violence regardless of the violence measure. Components are coming from principal component analysis
of all different violence data sub-categories.
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Table 3: News Reporting and Tourism Spending Reduced Form Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Spending) log(Numer of cards)
Panel A: News on tourist being targeted
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) -0.552*** -0.529*** -0.205** -0.628*** -0.617*** -0.192***
(0.092) (0.098) (0.090) (0.068) (0.074) (0.066)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23869 23869 23869
R2 .966 .967 .972 .97 .971 .979
Panel B: News on any fatal violence
News on violence with fatalities (count of articles) -0.458*** -0.337*** -0.196** -0.364*** -0.269*** -0.061
(0.092) (0.098) (0.093) (0.060) (0.062) (0.054)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23869 23869 23869
R2 .966 .967 .972 .97 .971 .979
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dest./Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Event controls NO YES NO NO YES NO
Dest./Time FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination/month level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables
are lagged by one month to account for the lagged response of tourism to events and news. Event controls are the first four principal
components combining the main country-level violence data series studied in Table 2 and Appendix Table A3.
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Table 4: Evidence on Relative Nature of Reporting Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Spending)
Panel A: News on tourist being targeted
News on tourists targeted (count of articles) -0.007** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.002)
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) -0.512*** -0.494***
(0.095) (0.101)
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) - first quartile -0.005 0.051
(0.051) (0.048)
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) - second quartile -0.087* -0.051
(0.049) (0.047)
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) - third quartile -0.160*** -0.123***
(0.041) (0.042)
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) - fourth quartile -0.304*** -0.297***
(0.079) (0.081)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859
R2 .966 .967 .966 .967
Panel B: News on any fatal violence
Violent events with fatalities (count of articles) -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) -0.422*** -0.351***
(0.097) (0.102)
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) - first quartile -0.065 -0.019
(0.047) (0.044)
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) - second quartile -0.063** -0.018
(0.025) (0.025)
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) - third quartile -0.085*** -0.035
(0.024) (0.025)
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) - fourth quartile -0.113*** -0.069**
(0.032) (0.032)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859
R2 .966 .967 .966 .966
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES
Dest./Month FE YES NO YES NO
Dest./Time FE NO YES NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination/month level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables
are lagged by one month to account for the lagged response of tourism to events and news. Event controls are the first four principal
components combining the main country-level violence data series studied in Table 2 and Appendix Table A3.
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable Regression of Reduced Form Effect: Instrumenting
news coverage intensity with known casualty-distribution for select events
(1) (2) (3)
News on tourists targeted
Panel A: first stage with reporting spillovers
Any tourist killed 0.181*** 0.191***
(0.050) (0.051)
Contiguous country x Any Casualties 0.149*** 0.147***
(0.038) (0.038)
Same region x Any Casualties 0.059** 0.058**
(0.024) (0.024)
Common language x Any Casualties 0.034** 0.033**
(0.015) (0.015)
R2 0.260 0.303 0.291
Panel B: Second stage: tourism spending
News measure (share of articles) -0.811 -0.790*** -0.787**
(0.601) (0.291) (0.333)
R2 0.967 0.967 0.967
Weak IV 11.265 15.611 15.331
Panel C: Second stage: number of active cards
News measure (share of articles) -1.188* -1.109*** -1.088***
(0.663) (0.297) (0.323)
R2 .971 .971 .971
Weak IV 11.3 15.6 15.3
Observations 23859 23859 23859
Dyad FE YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES
Dest./Month FE YES YES YES
Event controls YES YES YES
(4) (5) (6)
News on any fatal violence
0.063*** 0.069***
(0.023) (0.023)
0.065** 0.064**
(0.029) (0.029)
0.034* 0.033*
(0.019) (0.019)
0.030*** 0.030***
(0.010) (0.010)
0.307 0.317 0.315
-3.032 -1.492** -1.350*
(2.880) (0.723) (0.738)
0.963 0.966 0.966
3.121 7.792 8.516
-4.443 -2.327*** -2.133***
(3.989) (0.771) (0.758)
.961 .969 .969
3.12 7.79 8.52
23859 23859 23859
YES YES YES
YES YES YES
YES YES YES
YES YES YES
Notes: Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination/month level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables are lagged by one month to account for the lagged response
of tourism to events and news. Event controls are the first four principal components combining the
main country-level violence data series studied in Table 2 and Appendix Table A3
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Table 6: Calibrated Model of Tourism Beliefs and Tourism Activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Spending) log(Numer of cards)
probability of danger (based on violence data) -0.208*** -0.203***
(0.019) (0.020)
probability of danger (tourist news-based) -0.364*** -0.367***
(0.051) (0.049)
probability of danger (fatal news-based) -0.239*** -0.213***
(0.049) (0.055)
weighted probability of danger -0.750*** -0.795***
(0.060) (0.066)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859 23869 23869 23869 23869
R2 .966 .966 .966 .967 .971 .971 .97 .972
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dest./Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination/month level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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This appendix is subdivided into four sections. Section A presents further ro-
bustness checks and additional results as figures or tables that were omitted from
the main paper due to space constraints. Section B provides more details on the
grid-search used. Section C provides more information on the calculations for the
economic impact estimates. Lastly, Section D presents further description, results and
details about the machine-learning approach used to classify the 450,000 news articles.
A Further results and robustness checks
A.1 Event Regression Evidence for News
Complementary to Figure 3 we run the following specification
phdt = αk + αhd + αt + β× Postk,t + γk × (Postk,t × zk) + ehdt (12)
where we have defined a dummy variable Postk,t = 1 for τ = 0, 1, 2 for up to two
days following a violent event. Estimating equation (12) also allows us to explore
whether this average effect is heterogenous across a range of event characteristics
zk: the level of casualties, whether American’s are among the casualties and attacks
involving tourists.
We present results from specification (12) in Table A2. In columns (1) through (5)
the dependent variable is our news coverage covering the share of articles on a day is
classified as indicating violence with fatalities. In columns (6) to (10), the dependent
1
variable is the share of articles classified as indicating violence against tourists. In
columns (1) through (5) we observe that reporting increases sharply in the two days
after an event. The increase is larger when there are more casualties (column 1) and
if there any American casualties (column 2). Suicide attacks are also more heavily
covered (column 3) as well as attacks where tourists are targeted (column 4). Column
(5) shows that these all hold up when included together. In columns (6) through
(10) we repeat the analysis with the more refined measure that captures the share
of articles on a day indicating that tourists were targeted. Here, the most notable
observation is column (9), which highlights that, if an event is classified by the GTD
as having tourists as targets, the reporting measure increases sharply.
A.2 Event Study Evidence for Spending
To identify the effect of violence, the difference in difference approach relies on
there being a common underlying trend in spending between places that experienced
violent events and those did not. One way of exploring whether this is plausible is
to use an event study approach. This will also give us more insight into the timing
of the spending response to violent events.
For this purpose, we define an “event” as a month when casualties in the GTD
dataset surpass a given threshold. Across the five destination countries there is a total
of 256 country-by-month windows where an event with at least one casualty occurs
(out of a total of the maximum possible 420 country-by-month windows from 2010-
2016). For the empirical analysis, we focus on country-month event windows with at
least 10 casualties, resulting in a total of 83 event months.
To look at the response in spending, we construct a twelve month window around
each of these 83 event months which we denote by index k. We then use the following
empirical specification to model the relationship between violent events and tourism
activity:
ykhdt = αk + αhd + αht +
6
∑
τ=−6
(βτ × Time to event monthk,t−τ) + ekhd (13)
where, as above, ykhdt is the log of tourism spending in an event-month k from home
country h in country d at date t. This specification includes event fixed effects αk,
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dyad fixed effects αhd and issuing country by time effects αht. As before, we adjust
standard errors two way at the level of the dyad and event.
Estimating (13) permits us to trace out the patterns of aggregated spending around
an event month. The results are depicted in Figure A4 for both log of spending and
log of active card accounts. In both cases, there is no evidence of any anticipation
of the event. Moreover, the observed pattern suggest a sharp contraction in card
spending and the number of active cards with effects manifesting a month after an
event occurred. Moreover, this occurs with a one month lag as in core specification.
That said, it is clear that recovery from an event is quite slow.
In Appendix Table A4 we show that results are robust to dropping each country
in turn, highlighting that the results are not an artefact of any of the five destination
countries in our sample.
B Grid Search
In the grid search we proceeded as follows. We started from the estimation equa-
tion
yhdt = αhd + αht + αdm + ξ
9
∑
τ=0
ωτ (χΠdt−τ + (1− χ)pihdt−τ) + εhct. (14)
and used different combinations of weights χ,ωτ ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15..., 1} to calculate
the term
9
∑
τ=0
ωτ (χΠdt−τ + (1− χ)pihdt−τ) .
which we then use as a regressor in equation 14. We pick the parameter values that
yield the highest within R-squared. From this it should already be clear that assuming
two different sets of weights on Πdt−τ and pihdt−τ would lead to an explosion of the
complexity of the grid search. We therefore focus on one set of weights.
Note, that we did not impose any restrictions on the weights ωτ. This is remark-
able because we get the highest explanatory power with weights which (weakly) fall
over time. In particular, we get the weight sequence
0.2, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05.
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For χ we get a value of 0.4 which implies that only 40 percent of the agents in our
model are estimated to be sophisticated. However, sophisticated tourists will nonethe-
less drive most spending movements as the shifts in their beliefs are a lot more per-
sistent.
We also ran robustness checks with a different model in which we used the level of
violence, i.e. not only the state, as the variable that tourists are interested in. Results
are very similar in that model so that we decided not to report it for brevity.
C Calculations of Total Loss
Assume that we have a monthly log spending before the violence which we call
yb. Assume that this takes some value yb = x. The relationship between spending
and violence is given as
y ≈ x + ξ
9
∑
τ=0
ωτ (χΠdt−τ + (1− χ)pihdt−τ)
To compute the dollar value, we use the following transformation:
eyb − ey = ex − ex+ξ ∑9τ=0 ωτ(χΠdt−τ+(1−χ)pihdt−τ).
We do this simply by giving every destination country the average treatment value
coming out of all origin countries and applying it to the total tourism revenues mea-
sured at baseline in 2010.
In the 72 months after 2010 we find the following average losses per month: 0.042
(0.027) billion USD in Tunisia, 0.063 (0.041) billion USD in Israel, 0.163 (0.13) billion
USD in Egypt, 0.255 (0.171) billion USD in Turkey. Numbers in brackets indicate the
losses from sophisticated tourists alone. This means a total loss of 37.66 billion USD
and from news reporting alone 11.09 billion USD.
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Figure A1: Validation of aggregated spending data as a proxy for tourist arrivals: comparing subsets of data from the
UN World Tourism Organisation
Panel A: Egypt
German French British
Panel B: Tunisia
German French British
Notes: Figure plots dyadic data on tourist arrivals by destination country and by origin country, which is available annually for a small subset of countries from the UNWTO. The
aggregate active accounts data has been further aggregated to the year level. The figures plotted are residuals obtained from removing dyad fixed effects as well as year fixed
effects.
5
Figure A2: Distribution of Share of Articles on Fatal Violence and Violence Against
Tourists
Notes: Figure plots kernel density plotting the distribution of share of newspaper reporting on (any) fatal violence or on violence
directed towards tourists.
6
Figure A3: GTD Events and Reporting Activity: Noisy level effect on number of
articles around violent events
Notes: Figure plots point estimates from a regression that absorbs event, reporting dyad and day fixed effects. The plotted point
estimates capture the timing of reporting on a dyad specific to the timing of an individual event recorded in the GTD dataset.
90% confidence intervals obtained from clustering standard errors at the dyad level are indicated.
7
Figure A4: Event study evidence of the average effect of violent events on tourist activity
Panel A: log(Spending) Panel B: log(Cards)
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Notes: Figure plots results from an event study design exploring the effect of time series variation in the share of (any) fatal violence or on violence directed towards tourists across
four main countries.
8
Figure A5: Heterogeneity of the Effect of News reporting on Aggregated Spending by Card Issuing Country
Panel A: News on Tourists Targeted (Share) Panel B: News on Fatal Violence (Share)
Notes: Figure plots point estimates from a regression that absorbs dyad, issuing-country by time fixed effects and destination by month fixed effects. 90% confidence intervals
obtained from clustering standard errors at the dyad level are indicated.
9
Figure A6: Distribution of Beliefs about Safety or Danger
Notes: Figure plots the distribution of the posterior beliefs about a destination being safe or dangerous held by tourists from
different origin countries.
10
Figure A7: Evidence on the correlation between the level of news reporting and aver-
age beliefs about violence in months with violent events
Notes: Figure highlights the interactive relationship between the mean-level reporting on the x-axis about a destination country
and the estimated belief about the state of the world being dangerous conditional on there being bad news (violence with
fatalities or targeted at tourists) on the y-axis . The figure highlights that lower levels of mean reporting are associated with
higher levels of beliefs about the underlying state of the world indicating danger.
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Table A1: Validation of aggregate spending data and
official annual dyadic tourist arrival data available
from UNWTO for a small subset of countries
Accounts Transactions Spend
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
arrivals 0.700*** 1.189*** 182.604***
(0.197) (0.262) (60.961)
Dyads 294 294 294
Observations 1258 1258 1258
Panel B:
arrivals 0.535*** 1.048*** 126.985***
(0.097) (0.190) (39.719)
L.arrivals -0.016 -0.021 0.271
(0.067) (0.108) (20.866)
Dyads 290 290 290
Observations 974 974 974
Panel C:
F.arrivals 0.344** 0.619** 83.950***
(0.149) (0.256) (31.125)
arrivals 0.755*** 1.183*** 204.813***
(0.206) (0.299) (62.734)
Dyads 286 286 286
Observations 961 961 961
Dyad FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination by time
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explana-
tory variables are lagged by one month to account for the lagged
response of tourism to events. We also divide all explanatory
variables by their standard deviation so that the coefficients can
be interpreted as the response of spending to one standard de-
viation increase in violence regardless of the violence measure.
Components are coming from principal component analysis of
all different violence data sub-categories.
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Table A2: Event Characteristics and Reporting Intensity across dyads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Share of articles indicating fatal violence Share of articles indicating tourist targeted
post 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.003* -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
post × Casualties 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
post × US Casualties 0.014*** 0.016** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
post × Suicide attack 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.002*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004)
post × Tourist targeted 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 6033450 6122712 6122712 57855 57855 6033450 6122712 6122712 57855 57855
Number of Events
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Date FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Event FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination/month level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables are lagged by
one month to account for the lagged response of tourism to events and news. Event controls are the first four principal components of the eight violence
measures from Table 2, column (5).
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Table A3: Principal component-based violence measures and effect on aggregate spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
log(Spending) log(Cards)
Armed violence component 1 -0.081*** -0.067*** -0.086*** -0.068*** -0.053*** -0.065***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Armed violence component 2 -0.043* -0.040*** -0.029** -0.034 -0.034** -0.032**
(0.025) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
Armed violence component 3 0.021 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.008
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Armed violence component 4 -0.031** -0.015 -0.039*** -0.032**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 42254 42254 42254 42254 23859 42299 42299 42299 42299 23869
R2 .947 .947 .947 .947 .966 .97 .969 .969 .97 .971
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dest./Month FE YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO
Dest. x Time FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination by time level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables are lagged by one
month to account for the lagged response of tourism to events. We also divide all explanatory variables by their standard deviation so that the coefficients can
be interpreted as the response of spending to one standard deviation increase in violence regardless of the violence measure. Components are coming from
principal component analysis of all different violence data sub-categories.
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Table A4: Robustness of Effect of Violence and Aggregate Spending: Dropping each country in
turn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropping a country in turn
All EGY TUN TUR MAR ISR
Panel A:
Armed violence component 1 -0.081*** -0.041*** -0.094*** -0.114*** -0.067*** -0.095***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Observations 42268 33315 35610 32617 34241 32851
R2 .947 .954 .95 .945 .952 .953
Panel B:
GTD Events -0.076*** -0.030*** -0.089*** -0.110*** -0.063*** -0.085***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012)
Observations 42254 33315 35596 32600 34227 32834
R2 .947 .954 .95 .945 .952 .953
Panel C:
ICEWS armed violence events -0.068*** -0.025** -0.081*** -0.118*** -0.056*** -0.070***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 42254 33315 35596 32600 34227 32834
R2 .947 .954 .95 .945 .952 .953
Panel D:
UCDP Events -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.045***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016)
Observations 42254 33315 35596 32600 34227 32834
R2 .947 .954 .95 .944 .952 .953
Dest./Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination by time level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Explanatory variables are lagged by one month to account for the lagged response of tourism to events. We also
divide all explanatory variables by their standard deviation so that the coefficients can be interpreted as the response
of spending to one standard deviation increase in violence regardless of the violence measure. Components are
coming from principal component analysis of all different violence data sub-categories.
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Table A5: Relationship between Reporting and Aggregate Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Spending)
News on tourists targeted (count of articles) -0.006** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) -0.494*** -0.199**
(0.101) (0.091)
Armed violence component 1 -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.009) (0.009)
Armed violence component 2 -0.026*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.006)
Armed violence component 3 0.018*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
Armed violence component 4 -0.015* -0.016*
(0.009) (0.009)
Violent events with fatalities (count of articles) 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
News on violence with fatalities (share of all articles) -0.351*** -0.222**
(0.102) (0.096)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859
R2 .967 .972 .967 .972
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES
Origin/Time FE YES YES YES YES
Dest./Month FE YES NO YES NO
Event controls YES NO YES NO
Dest./Time FE NO YES NO YES
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination/month level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Explanatory variables are lagged by one month to account for the lagged response of tourism to events and news.
Event controls are the first four principal components of the eight violence measures from Table ??, column (6).
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Table A6: Robustness to additional control variables and different violent news coding cutoffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Additional controls Alternative classification cutoffs & not relying on hand coding
c = 0.5 precision = 0.90 precision = 0.95
Panel A: News on tourist being targeted
News on tourists targeted (share of all articles) -0.529*** -0.559*** -0.205** -0.153* -0.286*** -0.102** -0.852*** -0.327** -0.963*** -0.303
(0.098) (0.097) (0.090) (0.080) (0.045) (0.044) (0.168) (0.143) (0.257) (0.203)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859
R2 .967 .967 .972 .976 .967 .972 .967 .972 .967 .972
Panel B: News on any fatal violence
News on violence with fatalities (count of articles) -0.337*** -0.380*** -0.196** -0.199** -0.167*** -0.085** -0.337*** -0.196** -0.244*** -0.073
(0.098) (0.098) (0.093) (0.080) (0.040) (0.035) (0.098) (0.093) (0.082) (0.078)
Observations 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859 23859
R2 .967 .967 .972 .976 .967 .972 .967 .972 .966 .972
Dyad FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Origin by Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination by Month FE YES YES NO NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Destination by Time FE NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Dyad Linear Trend NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Exchange rate NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at destination by time level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory variables are lagged by one month to account for the lagged
response of tourism to events. We employ two alternative classification cutoffs c as discussed in section. In columns (5) - (10) we rely on the news measures constructed not using the
secondary hand coding procedure we described in . The columns explore alternative classification cutoffs to highlight results are robust. All explanatory variables by their standard deviation
so that the coefficients can be interpreted as the response of aggregate spending to one standard deviation increase in violence regardless of the violence measure.
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Table A7: Markov Chain Estimates of Parameters
hrid
EGY TUN TUR ISR MAR
mean violence in danger 0.46 0.300 0.50 0.431 0.27
mean violence in safety 0.31 0.270 0.30 0.309 0.27
difference (danger-safety) 0.14 0.030 0.20 0.122 0.00
persistence of danger 0.96 0.601 0.93 0.814 0.27
persistence of safety 0.99 0.856 0.97 0.929 0.84
Notes: Table reports estimates of the markov chain switching model param-
eters.
Table A8: Effect of Markov Chain Fitted Probability of Dan-
gerous State on Spending across destination countries
probability of danger (news-based) in Egypt -0.951***
(0.092)
probability of danger (news-based) in Israel -0.508***
(0.166)
probability of danger (news-based) in Morocco -0.214
(0.207)
probability of danger (news-based) in Tunisia -1.065***
(0.185)
probability of danger (news-based) in Turkey -0.524***
(0.095)
Observations 23859
R2 .967
Notes: All regressions include dyad, destination by month and origin
country by time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the
dyad level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Explanatory
variables are lagged by one month to account for the lagged response of
tourism to events. The dependent variable is the log of spending.
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D Description of Machine Learning Method and Vali-
dation
We developed the algorithm for spotting fatal violence and attacks on tourists to
identify articles out of sample. Training was always conducted on a balanced set,
i.e. 1:1 negatives and positives, but we knew that the final dataset would be very
imbalanced. This was a particularly important concern for attacks against tourists
which is why we checked the coding results by hand for these news.
In all applications we exclude tokens that appear in less than 100 articles. We
sometimes improved the fit with choosing a higher cutoff of around 150 articles but
we also wanted to use an additional method of dimension reduction, the singular
value decomposition (SVD), so that we chose 100 as a default. We looked at unigrams,
up to bigrams and up to trigrams and experimented extensively with them. Generally,
up to trigrams performed clearly the best and we therefor stuck to them.
We use three ways to classify the two news items. First, we use a random forest
of depth 12 for fatal violence and depth 9 for attacks against tourists. Second, we
use a random forest of the same depth but only after running the SVD. In addition,
we use a naive bayes classifier. All steps and hyperparameters were checked using
cross validation. A worry we had was that headlines would repeat similar key words
so that cross validation used a relatively small training sample (three folds). Figure
B1 illustrates the grid-search for the optimal tree depth for attacks against tourists
without the SVD, for example. We kept increasing the maximum tree depth and
recalculated the AUC on the testing sample of three folds. The Figure illustrates quite
nicely how the AUC first rises significantly but then stagnates and falls with rising
depth. In order to maintain out-of-sample performance we picked a relatively general
tree depth of 9. The higher tree depth of 12 for fatal violence reflects the fact that we
have many more circumstances of fatal violence and an algorithm that is able to pick
it up a lot better.
Figure B2 shows the performance of the three models, two random forest mod-
els and one NB model, on three different folds and on two different samples with
sampling rate of 1:1 and 1:10. The y-axis shows the AUC and the x-axis the average
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precision the respective classifier reached in the sample. The green dots show the
result of the ensemble classifier, the simple average of the other three scores. Three
things are clear from this. First, the NB performs a lot worse than the random forest -
both in terms of AUC and precision. Second, the ensemble is performing better than
the random forest, despite the fact that it uses the NB. Thirdly, the precision of the
ensemble is less affected by the imbalance and therefore a lot more stable across the
different samples. This is an important reason for us to adopt the ensemble method.
Figure B3 shows the precision recall curve for fatal violence on three random folds
and Figure B4 shows the same curve for violence against tourists. These figures are
particularly important in a context with imbalanced data in which we are worried
about precision. ”Recall” on the x-axis is the true positive rate, i.e. the share of all
actual articles with violence which the algorithm picks up. ”Precision” on the y-axis
is the rate at which articles which were identified as articles with violence actually
were articles with violence. Clearly, precision is a lot lower when trying to identify
violence against tourists. While the average precision is close to 0.85 for fatal violence
it is between 0.59 and 0.71 for violence against tourists. This implies that our precision
cut-offs of 90 percent will exclude a lot more articles when we try to identify violence
against tourists.
This is why we added an additional layer of hand-coding for violence against
tourists. The analysis of mistakes made by the algorithm reveals something interest-
ing about the task of spotting violence against tourists in newspaper articles. Some
of these mistakes were difficult judgement calls such as news on shark attacks (on
tourists) or an attack on a military bus in Egypt in which no tourists died. Some other
manual recodings were driven by the text we downloaded, for example, declarations
by our destination countries about events in other countries or when citizens of our
destination countries conducted attacks elsewhere. These were downloaded as events
in the destination countries and identified by the algorithm as being about tourists
being attacked. Most remaining mistakes were driven by reactions to attacks, such as
governments investigating the attackers, tourists fleeing the attack or reports about
the court cases. We kept many of these codings if they were in the direct aftermath of
an attack but excluded them if they were news reports on actions that were not taken
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in the direct context of an attack.
We also used the hand-coding to get an impression of the error rate that we im-
posed through our cutoffs. Between the cutoffs of c = 0.8 and c = 0.75 we hand-code
626 negatives and 192 positives, i.e. the proportions change considerably compared
to the sample above c = 0.8. Also we find a rapidly declining rate of false negatives
in the remaining recodings. In 4,000 additional observations below c = 0.75 we found
only an additional 416 positives. This is a rate decline of positives per article of 0.904
to 0.235 and 0.104 so that we suspect that the remaining articles will not contain a lot
of actual positives. The resulting distribution of coded attacks is displayed in Figure
B5 which shows two kernel densities. The first kernel density displays the overall
distribution of predictions for violence against tourists coming out of the ensemble.
Clearly, the predictions indicate that attacks against tourists is a rare event with most
mass at low predictions. The red curve then shows the distribution of probabilities for
the articles we identified through the hand coding. This provides a good confirmation
of the decreased rate at which positives could be in the sample.1
The final proof that the algorithm works comes from a feature of the downloading
process. We hand-coded only on articles downloaded from Lexis Nexis but, as we
realized the method would work, later downloaded twice as much articles from dif-
ferent countries from Faktiva. In the sample that we confirmed by hand the algorithm
had spotted 535 attacks against tourists in the Lexis Nexis sample and 1,052 attacks
against tourists in the Faktiva sample. This is a true out-of sample test which implies
that we have managed to develop a automated detection of attacks on tourists from
the news.
1The few positives for low scores were identified from sources with very few articles as our RA
sampled the 100 top articles from all sources.
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Figure B1: Bias-variance trade-off in search for random forest tree depth
Notes: Figure plots out the AUC curve obtained on the testing sample. For each different maximum tree depth, the AUC is
recalculated the three folds. The figure highlights the bias-variance trade-off as the AUC first rises as models are allowed to
become more flexible but then stagnates and starts falling as models become too flexible and start overfitting the training data,
resulting in worse accuracy in the testing samples.
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Figure B2: AUC and Precision across a set of different models
Notes: Figure plots the AUC and precision measured obtained on different folds of data highlighting that Naive Bayes performs
worse compared to Random Forests, but that the ensemble of models outperforms the two. Precision of the algorithm captures
the share of all correctly classified articles indicating violent events with fatalities among all articles that the algorithm classifies
as indicating violence with fatalities.
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Figure B3: Classification of articles capturing fatal violence: precision and recall across
folds
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Recall
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ec
isi
on
Precision/Recall Curve
Pr/Rec fold 0 (av. Pr. = 0.85)
Pr/Rec fold 1 (av. Pr. = 0.85)
Pr/Rec fold 2 (av. Pr. = 0.84)
Notes: Figure plots recall on the x-axis. Recall is the true positive rate capturing the share of all actual articles with violence that
are correctly picked up by the algorithm picks up AUC. The vertical axis plots out precision, which is the share of all correctly
classified articles indicating any violent events with fatalities among all articles that the algorithm classifies as indicating any
violent events with fatalities.
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Figure B4: Classification of articles capturing violence against tourists: precision and
recall across folds
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Recall
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
ec
isi
on
Precision/Recall Curve
Pr/Rec fold 0 (av. Pr. = 0.59)
Pr/Rec fold 1 (av. Pr. = 0.71)
Pr/Rec fold 2 (av. Pr. = 0.65)
Notes: Figure plots recall on the x-axis. Recall is the true positive rate capturing the share of all actual articles with violence that
are correctly picked up by the algorithm picks up AUC. The vertical axis plots out precision, which is the share of all correctly
classified articles indicating violence against tourists among all articles that the algorithm classifies as indicating violence
against tourists.
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Figure B5: Predicted conditional probabilities of class labels after computing ensem-
ble: clear separation of data is achieved
Notes: Figure displays the kernel densities associated with the empirical distributions of the predicted class labels after the
ensemble. The data are clearly separated between the two classes.
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Table B1: Newspaper coverage sample and sources included
Country Main Source Name Article count Language Main Source Flag
ARE Gulf News 4712 arabic LexisNexis
ARG Source: La Nacio´n (Argentina, Spanish Language) 822 spanish Factiva
AUS Syndey Morning Herald 4492 english LexisNexis
AUT Der Standard 5901 german Factiva
BEL Agentschap Belga (Belgium, Dutch Language) 2140 dutch Factiva
BHR Akhbar Al Khaleej.com (Bahrain, Arabic Language) 20243 arabic Factiva agency
BRA O Globo 3534 portuguese LexisNexis
CAN The Toronto Start 4563 english LexisNexis
CHE Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung 4427 german Factiva
CHL La Nacio´n (Chile, Spanish Language) 2707 spanish Factiva
CHN Xinhua News Agency 70554 english LexisNexis agency
COL El Tiempo (Colombia, Spanish Language) 593 spanish Factiva
CYP Cyprus Mail 4143 english Factiva
CZE CIA Daily News 920 english LexisNexis
DEU Die Welt 5380 german Factiva
DNK Politiken / Politiken Weekly 6186 danish LexisNexis
ESP El Paı´s 29187 spanish Factiva
EST Baltic Business Daily 272 english Factiva
FIN Helsinki Times 736 english LexisNexis
FRA Le Figaro 16072 french Factiva
GBR Daily Telegraph 5755 english Factiva
GRC Athens News Agency 2334 english Factiva
HKG South China Morning Post 855 english Factiva
HRV HINA (Croatia) 723 english Factiva
HUN MTI - EcoNews (Hungary) 736 english Factiva
IND Hindustan Times 3861 english Factiva
IRL The Irish Times 5352 english Factiva
ITA Correrie della Sera 8682 italian LexisNexis
JPN The Tokyo Shimbun 137 japanese Factiva
JOR Addustour (Jordan, Arabic Language) 38402 arabic Factiva
KOR Chosun Ilbo 1129 korean/english Factiva
KWT Kuwait News Agency (Arabic Language) 37195 arabic LexisNexis agency
LBN Tayyar.org (Arabic Language) 10977 arabic Factiva
LTU Lithuanian News Agency - ELTA 969 english Factiva
LUX Tageblatt (Luxembourg, German Language) 2777 german/french Factiva
LVA Vesti Segodnya (Latvia, Russian Language) 793 russian Factiva
MEX Reforma (Mexico, Spanish Language) 1511 spanish Factiva
MYS Berita Dalam Negeri 745 malay Factiva
NLD De Telegraaf 4691 dutch Factiva
NZL The New Zealand Herald 1935 english LexisNexis
OMN Al Shabiba (Oman, Arabic Language) 9201 arabic Factiva
PHL Manila Bulletin (Philippines) 1354 english Factiva
POL Gazeta Wyborcza 738 polish Factiva
PRT Jornal de Notı´cias 1870 portuguese Factiva
QAT Qatar Tribune 446 english Factiva
ROM AGERPRES (Romania) 1212 english Factiva agency
RUS RIA Novosti (Russia, Russian Language) 55008 russian Factiva agency
SAU Arab News 2655 english Factiva
SGP The Straits Times 1395 english Factiva
SVK TASR - Tlacova Agentura Slovenskej Republiky 407 slovak LexisNexis
SVN STA (Slovenia) 757 english LexisNexis
THA The Nation (Thailand) 1352 english Factiva
TUR Dunya (Turkey, Turkish Language) 27786 turkish Factiva agency
TWN Liberty Times (Taiwan, Chinese Language - Traditional) 1180 chinese Factiva
UKR Delo.ua (Ukraine, Russian Language) 2387 russian Factiva
USA New York Times 18783 english Factiva
ZAF Cape Times 2989 english Factiva
Notes: Table presents the names of the main newspaper sources used by country in the paper, along with the original source
language and the number of articles covered.
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Table B2: Example News Headlines coded as covering violence with fatalities
Country Year Month Headline Pˆk(Yi = 1 |Di)]
TUR 2011 8 One soldier killed in clash with PKK rebels in southern Turkey 0.987
TUR 2012 10 3 police officers killed in clashes with PKK in Turkey 0.987
EGY 2015 2 17 killed in security raids in Egypt’s Sinai 0.987
EGY 2014 4 7 extremists killed, 20 injured in Egypt’s Sinai raids 0.987
TUR 2016 9 Two soldiers killed in clashes with PKK in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2012 8 2 PKK members killed in southeast Turkey 0.986
TUR 2015 8 2 soldiers killed in PKK attack in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2016 9 2 soldiers killed in clash with PKK in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2012 10 6 PKK members killed in operation in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2016 6 6 soldiers killed in PKK attacks in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2016 3 4 soldiers killed in PKK bomb attack in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2012 10 3 PKK rebels killed in clash in eastern Turkey 0.986
TUR 2012 8 21 killed, 7 wounded in clashes after mine blasts in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2012 11 5 PKK rebels killed in military operation in SE Turkey 0.986
TUR 2013 1 One soldier killed in clashes in SE Turkey 0.986
EGY 2013 9 1 soldier killed, 9 injured by militants in Egypt’s Sinai 0.986
TUR 2015 10 3 soldiers killed in clashes with PKK in SE Turkey 0.986
EGY 2013 7 3 terrorists killed in car bomb explosion in Egypt’s Sinai 0.986
EGY 2014 9 18 extremists killed in security raid in Egypt’s Sinai 0.985
TUR 2012 11 5 Turkish soldiers killed in clash with PKK militants 0.985
EGY 2013 7 2 policemen killed by extremists in Egypt’s Sinai 0.985
TUR 2012 12 42 PKK militants killed in eastern Turkey 0.985
TUR 2016 4 1 soldier killed in PKK bomb attack in SE Turkey 0.985
EGY 2015 9 2 killed in suicide car bombing in Egypt’s Sinai 0.985
EGY 2013 9 Several militants killed in military raid in Egypt’s Sinai: security source 0.985
TUR 2016 4 2 soldiers killed in PKK bomb attack in SE Turkey 0.985
EGY 2013 9 Urgent: Several militants killed in military raid in Egypt’s Sinai: security sou 0.985
EGY 2015 2 15 extremists killed in security raid in Egypt’s Sinai 0.985
TUR 2012 7 1 Turkish soldier killed, 3 wounded in clashes with PKK 0.985
EGY 2013 8 Urgent: 5 soldiers killed, 8 injured by gunmen in Egypt’s Sinai 0.985
EGY 2013 7 Urgent: 2 policemen killed by extremists in Egypt’s Sinai 0.985
TUR 2016 3 Update: 4 soldiers, 1 policeman killed in PKK attacks in SE Turkey 0.985
TUR 2010 8 Five PKK rebels killed in clash in southeast Turkey 0.985
EGY 2013 9 9 militants killed in Egypt’s Sinai raid: army 0.985
TUR 2012 10 3 soldiers killed in PKK attacks on outposts 0.985
TUR 2011 10 Village guard killed in clash with PKK in southeast Turkey 0.984
TUR 2012 8 4 soldiers killed, 2 wounded in mine blast in SE Turkey 0.984
EGY 2015 10 Police killed in blast in Egypt’s Sinai 0.984
EGY 2014 6 8 extremists killed in security raids in Egypt’s Sinai 0.984
TUR 2012 7 15 PKK members killed in clashes with troops in southeastern Turkey 0.984
EGY 2013 8 25 policemen killed in attack in Egypt’s Sinai: official 0.984
TUR 2016 9 5 soldiers killed, 6 wounded in PKK attack in SE Turkey 0.984
EGY 2013 9 Urgent: 1 soldier killed, 9 injured by militants in Egypt’s Sinai 0.984
EGY 2013 7 2 policemen killed by gunmen in Egypt’s Sinai 0.984
EGY 2015 7 5 soldiers killed in Egypt’s north Sinai in clash with IS branch 0.984
TUR 2012 12 3 PKK members killed in eastern Turkey 0.984
TUR 2011 9 One policeman and wife killed by PKK in eastern Turkey 0.984
TUR 2012 6 Two killed in clashes in southeastern Turkey 0.984
TUR 2016 7 3 police killed in PKK bomb attack in SE Turkey 0.984
TUR 2016 3 26 PKK militants killed in SE Turkey 0.984
Notes: Table presents some example headlines of articles that are classified as being covering violence along with the estimated
Pˆk(Yi = 1 |Di)].
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Table B3: Example News Headlines coded as covering violence
Country Year Month Headline Pˆk(Yi = 1 |Di)]
TUN 2015 3 Spanish couple escapes Tunisia attack by hiding in cupboard for 23 hours 0.948
TUN 2015 6 Kuwait Embassy in Tunisia: no Kuwaiti nat’ls in Tunisia terrorist attack 0.934
TUN 2015 6 Urgent: Armerd men attack Sousse hotel in Tunisia 0.889
TUN 2015 6 Austrian Chancellor’s expresses sorrow over Kuwait, Tunisia and France attacks 0.881
TUN 2015 6 Tunisia apprehends culprits behind Sousse resort attack 0.870
TUN 2015 3 1st LD: 19 killed, including 17 tourists, in Tunisia’s museum attack: PM 0.865
EGY 2012 2 Three South Korean tourists held by locals in Egypt’s Sinai, kidnapper identifie 0.862
TUN 2013 11 Suicide bomber targets top Tunisian tourist destination 0.861
TUN 2016 3 Roundup: Jihadist attacks shiver Tunisia’s calm, eliciting casualties 0.857
EGY 2014 2 S. Korea censures terrorist attack on tourist bus in Egypt 0.846
MAR 2011 4 Sarkozy condemns Marrakech attack 0.844
TUN 2015 6 Thousands of European tourists are evacuated from Tunisia 0.835
TUN 2015 3 8 tourists killed in Tunisia museum attack 0.835
TUN 2015 11 A new attack is enraged with the Tunisian transition 0.832
EGY 2014 2 Urgent: Tourist bus explodes in Egypt’s Taba, casualties feared 0.828
TUN 2015 6 Thousands of European tourists are evacuated from Tunisia ¡¿ 0.826
TUR 2016 6 A suicide attack causes at least 36 deaths at the Istanbul airport 0.825
TUN 2015 3 Slovak gov’t sends plane to evacuate Children’s Folk Group from Tunisia 0.818
TUR 2016 1 The jihadist attack on the hotel in Burkina causes 23 dead 0.817
EGY 2012 2 Three South Korean tourists held by locals in Egypt’s Sinai 0.814
TUN 2015 3 Third French tourist probably killed in Tunis attack: Hollande 0.814
TUR 2016 6 A suicide attack causes at least 28 deaths at the Istanbul airport 0.808
TUN 2015 6 Thousands of visitors are evacuated from Tunisia after the attack 0.806
TUN 2015 3 Two Spanish pensioners die in the attack against the Bardo Museum 0.805
TUN 2015 6 Bloody Friday Jihadism shows its cruelty in the attacks in Tunisia Lyon and Kuwa 0.803
TUN 2015 3 Feature: Italy mourns four victims in Tunisia’s museum attack 0.798
TUN 2015 6 Tunisia’s transitional priority target of terror 0.794
TUN 2015 3 We thought we were going to die, we’ve had a terrible time 0.793
TUN 2015 3 Roundup: Tunisia tries to restore national image after deadly museum attack 0.792
TUN 2015 3 Tunisia ... Hostages taken after attack at Bardo museum 0.791
EGY 2012 2 Urgent: Egypt’s Bedouins release three South Korean tourists 0.791
TUN 2015 6 Gunman Focused on Tourists in Slaughter at a Tunisian Beach Hotel 0.786
TUN 2015 6 I could hear the bullets whining Gary Pine English tourist on the beach in Souss 0.786
TUN 2015 3 2nd LD: 21 killed, including 17 foreigners, in Tunisia’s museum attack: PM 0.783
TUN 2015 3 Militants hold tourists hostages inside Tunisia museum 0.780
TUN 2015 6 Irish woman among fatalities in Tunisia attack 0.762
TUN 2015 6 Scores Die in Attack at Tunisian Beach Hotel 0.758
TUN 2015 6 5th LD: Death toll rises to 37 in catastrophic hotel attack in Tunisia 0.756
TUN 2015 6 Norway condemns attacks in Tunisia, France, Kuwait 0.753
TUN 2015 3 Belgium to open own investigation into Tunisia attacks 0.752
TUN 2015 3 Bardo museum reopens a week after killings; Tunisia sends out message country s 0.744
TUN 2015 6 4th LD: 28 killed, 36 injured in terror attack on Tunisia hotel 0.739
TUN 2015 6 Thousands of visitors are evacuated from Tunisia after the attack ¡¿ 0.735
TUN 2015 3 The attack of the Bardo museum in Tunisia .. What do we know about the nationali 0.734
TUN 2015 6 Germany condemns deadly hotel attack in Tunisia 0.732
TUN 2015 6 After Tunisia attack, UK ups Wimbledon security 0.729
TUN 2015 3 Hollande expresses solidarity with Tunisia after deadly attack 0.726
TUN 2015 6 Deaths of British nationals in Friday’s attack in Tunisia rise to 15: FCO 0.725
EGY 2012 2 1st LD Egypt’s Bedouins release three South Korean tourists 0.717
TUN 2015 6 3rd LD: Terrorist suspect in Tunisia’s hotel attack arrested: official 0.711
Notes: Table presents some example headlines of articles that are classified as being covering violence along with the estimated
Pˆk(Yi = 1 |Di)].
29
